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FEDERALISM R.I.P.? DID THE ROBERTS HEARINGS
JUNK THE REHNQUIST COURT'S
FEDERALISM REVOLUTION?
Simon Lazarus*
INTRODUCTION: HALFWAY BACK TO THE ORIGINAL-
DEMOCRATIC-UNDERSTANDING
In the spring of 1995, five members of the Supreme Court launched
what was widely seen as a historic turf war against Congress. For the
first time since the New Deal, the Court held that a federal statute, the
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, exceeded congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.1 Chief Justice William Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion in United States v. Lopez announced its intention to rein
in federal domestic legislative power with an apocalyptic pledge to
"start with first principles"-including the "principle" that "[t]he Con-
stitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers."' 2 As-
serting that there are activities "that the states may regulate but
Congress may not," Rehnquist stated that henceforth the federal com-
merce power would be bounded by a categorical-albeit unspeci-
fied-"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local."' 3 Lopez, and other decisions limiting congressional authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause,4 pro-
voked fiery opposition from the four dissenting members of the Court.
It also drove leading liberal academics to write books with fevered
titles that advocated Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts5
* Public Policy Counsel to the National Senior Citizens Law Center, and Senior Counsel,
Sidley Austin LLP. An earlier version of this Article appeared as a White Paper commissioned
by the American Constitution Society. I have benefited from the work, wisdom, and specific
criticisms of a number of people in preparing this paper, particularly my colleagues at NSCLC,
Lauren Saunders, Edward King, and Rochelle Bobroff. Responsibility for the finished product
is, of course, solely my own.
1. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. Id. at 552.
3. Id. at 564-65, 567-68.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding the Violence Against
Women Act's private civil remedy invalid under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding damages remedy for
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act invalid as applied to state governments
under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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and invoked a prerevolutionary tradition of "popular constitutional-
ism" that vested power in The People Themselves.6 One influential
critique, by a widely admired Reagan circuit court appointee, charged
that the recent Supreme Court decisions had "return[ed] the country
to a pre-Civil War understanding of the Nation."'7
But from Congress itself, the apparent victim of the "Federalism
Five's"'8 attack, only a few sporadic individual protests were heard. To
be sure, both houses of Congress were controlled, like the Supreme
Court itself, by narrow Republican majorities. Nevertheless, most of
the statutes struck down by the Court's expanding array of federalism-
based doctrines had been enacted after years of extensive legislative
work by lopsided bipartisan majorities. 9 The intrusive supervisory au-
thority the Court asserted to disregard congressional factual findings,
second-guess policy judgments, and micro-manage the selection of
legislative ends and means, might have been expected to provoke an
institutional backlash from members of Congress of all political
stripes. For ten years, no such reaction emerged.
But in September 2005, during the Senate Judiciary Committee's
hearings on Judge John Roberts' nomination for Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Committee broke Congress'
decade-long silence. The coverage of the inquiry has been predomi-
nantly negative. The Judiciary Committee members have been de-
rided as timid and inept in their questioning, while Roberts was
criticized as evasive, avoiding any clear picture of what his approach
to major issues would be-making him "too much of a mystery" to
confirm. 10 In fact, on the record of the hearing and relevant Supreme
Court decisions, such dismissive slaps are quite unwarranted, at least
in this particular area of congressional domestic authority-"federal-
6. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW (2004).
7. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES (2002).
8. In addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Associate Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas formed the majority in virtually every one of
the Court's post-Lopez "federalism" decisions. Associate Justices John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer dissented in virtually every case, often in
passionate, and sometimes angry terms.
9. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (partially invalidat-
ing the Americans with Disabilities Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (invalidating provision of the
1994 Violence Against Women Act); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (invalidating the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 and the 1973 amendment thereto); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act). All had strong bipartisan co-spon-
sorship and voting support.
10. Editorial, Too Much of a Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at DlI (urging rejection of
Roberts' nomination after his hearing).
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ism." On this important set of issues, the Committee asked sophisti-
cated, well-informed, and even probing questions. Four Democrats
and, more surprisingly, three Republicans, including Chairman Arlen
Specter, registered if not a full-fledged backlash, then at least an initial
pushback, against the Rehnquist Court's federalism catechism and its
"denigration" of congressional power and status vis-A-vis the judiciary.
Roberts' responses were sometimes evasive and even misleading. But
more frequently, he offered surprisingly elaborate views of the Rehn-
quist Court's federalism campaign-views that were, frequently,
pointedly critical.
Specter and several of his colleagues branded the Rehnquist Court's
federalism decisions a mere cover for the "usurpation" of congres-
sional authority-"the hallmark agenda of the judicial activism of the
Rehnquist Court."'1 Moving beyond rhetoric to legal argument, Spec-
ter specifically targeted the Court's abandonment of its long-standing
principle that courts must uphold the constitutionality of federal laws
as long as Congress could have had a "rational basis" for enacting
them.' 2
In response, the nominee effectively embraced the senators' cri-
tique, insofar as it concerned laws implementing the Commerce
Clause. He asserted that the Court itself had recanted the confronta-
tional approach proclaimed in Lopez a decade earlier, in its 2005 deci-
sion in Gonzales v. Raich, which held that federal drug laws
preempted state laws legalizing medicinal marijuana.' 3 Roberts em-
phasized that, Chief Justice Rehnquist's grandiose rhetoric notwith-
standing, Raich meant that Lopez did not "junk" precedents
extending back two hundred years, especially the late twentieth-cen-
tury decisions validating massive expansions of federal domestic au-
thority engineered by the New Deal of the 1930s, and myriad civil
rights, health care, environmental, and other reform legislation of the
1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s.
In lawyers' code, Roberts' gloss on Raich reinstates the deferential
approach endorsed by Senator Specter; the Commerce Clause em-
powers Congress to legislate on any matter that it could rationally
conclude might substantially affect the national economy. In effect,
this interpretation relies almost totally on legislative politics to define
the limits of the commerce power, and comes close to giving Congress
a blank check and draining practical meaning from the concept of a
11. Letter from Senator Arlen Specter to the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr. (Aug. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Letter of Aug. 8].
12. Id.
13. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
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federal government with judicially enforced "enumerated powers."
This is precisely why conservative commentators complained so bit-
terly that Raich meant "the end of the federalism revolution.' 14
Roberts' responses regarding the other planks in the Court's feder-
alism platform-slashing Congress' authority to enforce equal protec-
tion and due process rights conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and disempowering private individuals and groups from enforcing fed-
eral statutory rights in court-were distinctly mixed. He was forth-
coming in some respects, yet in others less so. Neither he nor the
Court's decisions have, to date, abandoned these latter Rehnquist
Court initiatives as a matter of current black letter law. These initia-
tives continue to threaten major twentieth-century reform laws, such
as civil rights laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
environmental laws, and Medicaid and other safety-net laws. How-
ever, as a matter of underlying principle, the Roberts-Raich 180-de-
gree reversal on the Commerce Clause has knocked the logical pillars
out from any claim that these doctrinal initiatives were inspired, or
can be justified, by devotion to principles of "federalism." By reaf-
firming that commerce power-based laws must stand if "rational,"
Roberts and the Court have highlighted the inconsistency of-and left
no apparent defense for-retaining different and radically more intru-
sive judicial scrutiny of legislation implementing the Fourteenth
Amendment or other constitutional provisions. Of course, this does
not necessarily mean that the Roberts Court will prefer logical consis-
tency to promoting conservative policy goals, but only that it may find
the latter course more awkward to rationalize. Perhaps the Court's
critics, and especially the press, will see through conservatives' "feder-
alism" rhetoric, and stop repeating it, to avoid giving further credit to
the notion that their goal is neutral-principled restoration of some
imagined Jeffersonian devolution. In fact, the selectivity with which
federalism doctrines are invoked shows that the real agenda is simply
to undermine particular laws like the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
that they disdain, but lack the necessary congressional or popular sup-
port to repeal.
Developments since Chief Justice Roberts' accession to the Court
confirm the contradictory signals sent at his hearing. In 2006, the
Court decided five important federalism cases, three in January and
14. Ramesh Ponnuru, The End of the Federalism Revolution, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 4,
2005; see also Michael S. Greve, Down with Dope. Up with Hope?, AM. ENTER. INST. FEDERAL-
ISM PROJECT, June 7, 2005, http://www.federalismproject.org/supremecourt/?p=9.
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two in June during the last week of the term.' 5 In the most noted of
the three January decisions, Gonzales v. Oregon, observers empha-
sized the states' rights-oriented result (though liberal in policy terms),
where a 6-3 majority denied the Attorney General the authority to
preempt Oregon's assisted suicide law. But through the lens of the
post-Lopez debate about federalism-based, constitutional, court-im-
posed limits on congressional authority, the key fact was that all nine
justices acknowledged that the Commerce Clause empowered Con-
gress to give the Attorney General that authority if it chooses. 16 No
one contended, as Chief Justice Rehnquist said of secondary educa-
tion in Lopez, that defining legitimate medical practice to include phy-
sician-assisted suicide was categorically reserved for exclusive state
control.
The two other, less-noticed, January federalism decisions both in-
volved the Rehnquist Court's expansion of state "sovereign immu-
nity" to block suits against state-affiliated entities. 17 This thread of
federalism doctrine affects congressional legislative authority pursu-
ant to both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as other sources of congressional power. Consistent with the
fleeting and ambiguous treatment of sovereign immunity in the Rob-
erts and Alito hearings, the two decisions seemed to slow-but not
necessarily reverse-its advance. In United States v. Georgia, Justice
Scalia wrote, for a unanimous Court, an opinion that resoundingly af-
firmed congressional authority to empower citizens to sue states for
violation of the ADA, or other laws enforcing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, insofar as such laws or lawsuits target conduct that "actually
violates the Fourteenth Amendment" independent of the statute.18
The decision-surprising for the tone and breadth of the Court's sup-
port, if not necessarily for the result-could revitalize judicial enforce-
ment provisions of the ADA that had recently been considered on life
support. Just how much revitalization may transpire is open to ques-
tion, as Justice Scalia painstakingly distinguished other recent deci-
sions in which he and other conservative justices had voted to extend
state immunity.19
15. The January decisions were Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990
(2006); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006); and United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877
(2006). The June decisions were Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) and Arlington
Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
16. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904.
17. See Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990; United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877.
18. United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. at 882.
19. Id. at 881.
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In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, a 5-4 majority held
that the Rehnquist Court's state "sovereign immunity" doctrine did
not bar Congress from authorizing federal bankruptcy trustees to re-
cover monies inappropriately transferred by bankrupt entities to state
agencies.20 As with United States v. Georgia, the future significance of
the Katz holding is unclear. The new Chief Justice voted with the con-
servative minority to continue ratcheting up the scope of state sover-
eign immunity; that minority could well become a 5-4 majority, now
that the apparently more assertive conservative Samuel Alito has re-
placed Justice O'Connor.
In the last week of the term, Alito joined Roberts, Scalia, and
Thomas in hard-line opinions in two significant cases that shroud pros-
pects for a quick or definitive abandonment of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism doctrines. In Rapanos v. United States, two opinions on a
splintered Court seem to assure that a 5-4 majority exists for interpre-
tative standards that preserve a comparatively flexible and broad view
of federal power under the Clean Water Act (CWA), to regulate wet-
lands to prevent contamination of navigable waters.2' But the con-
servative quartet signed onto an opinion by Justice Scalia, in which he
adopted precisely the sort of rigid, categorical restriction on federal
regulatory authority that six justices had rejected a year earlier in
Gonzales v. Raich, when the regulation of marijuana was at stake.22
Particularly noteworthy was the fact that Chief Justice Roberts joined
this opinion, which did not reflect the brand of deference to the legis-
lative and executive branches he endorsed in his confirmation hearing
regarding Commerce Clause legislation and, specifically, environmen-
tal legislation.2 3
In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,
also decided in the final week of the term, Justice Alito wrote the
20. Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005.
21. 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214-35 (2006). Justice Kennedy, in a lone concurring opinion that may
dictate the operative legal standard going forward, construed the CWA to reach wetlands with a
"significant nexus" to navigable waters, even if they lacked a permanent surface water link; the
four "liberal" justices voted to uphold traditional deference to federal regulators as long as their
judgments are "reasonable." Id. at 2236-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2252-65 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); see infra Part V.A.
22. Compare Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214-35 with Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005);
see infra Part V.A.
23. See infra Part V. Roberts, in his separate concurrence, seemed to signal that his vote had
less to do with support for Justice Scalia on the merits than with his disappointment with the
relevant federal agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for not coming up with its own
limitation of its CWA jurisdiction. Id. Nevertheless, his vote in this case indicates that Roberts
cannot at this point be counted on to adhere to traditional "modest," deferential, post-1937
approaches to construing the reach of major twentieth-century federal regulatory schemes. Id.
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opinion of the Court, which Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy
joined. The case concerned the relatively narrow and specific ques-
tion of whether plaintiffs prevailing in actions to enforce the Individu-
als with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) are entitled to
reimbursement for consultant's services as part of the attorney's fees
award mandated by the Act. However, in ruling that such services are
not covered by the Act, Justice Alito went out of his way to tighten
the Rehnquist Court's doctrine that conditions incident to the receipt
of federal grant funds must be spelled out in the text of the particular
statute in question to be enforceable in court.24 Alito's opinion could
herald a broad new level of threat to the ability of beneficiaries of
federal safety-net programs to vindicate federal guarantees.
In any event, the results of Chief Justice Roberts' first term rein-
force the impression left by his confirmation testimony that Rehn-
quist-style federalism will continue to be in play under the new
regime. Exactly how it will play out and where it will lead is uncer-
tain. The accession of Justice Alito deepens that uncertainty. It is not
entirely clear whether he will go along with Chief Justice Roberts'
brusque refusal to read Lopez as the start of an anti-New Deal coun-
terrevolution. Ten years ago, on the Third Circuit, Alito wrote a dis-
sent reaching precisely the opposite conclusion, when he ruled that
the federal ban on possession of machine guns exceeded Lopez-in-
spired strictures on Congress' Commerce Clause authority.2 5 Further,
in his January 2006 confirmation hearing, Alito declined numerous
opportunities to acknowledge-as Roberts had-that his radical inter-
pretation had been definitively sidelined by Raich. However, at least
with respect to Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Alito's impact will
probably be limited. Only three members of the original Federalism
Five (Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas) kept the faith to dissent in
Raich, two of whom, of course, are no longer on the Court. So, bar-
ring a brazen volte-face by Roberts, and Scalia as well, the Raich volte-
face on Congress' Commerce Clause authority will stand for the fore-
seeable future. It is, of course, possible that Scalia's plurality opinion
in Rapanos v. United States limiting the scope of the Clean Water Act,
in which Roberts somewhat cryptically concurred, could presage just
such a reversal of direction. But Rapanos was a statutory interpreta-
24. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-64 (2006).
25. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273. 286-94 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting); see
also Simon Lazarus & Lauren Saunders, Gunning for Congress: Samuel Alito's Federalist Bent





tion case which implicated constitutional limits on Commerce Clause
authority in an attenuated manner-if at all. It now seems unlikely,
though not inconceivable, that more than three members of the cur-
rent Court will take up the invitation, extended by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in Lopez, to frontally challenge Congress' broad post-New Deal
authority to implement the Commerce Clause.
Only time will tell whether this apparent rolling up of the Court's
Commerce Clause foray will take with it the other federalism domi-
noes. It is unclear whether Roberts' exchanges with the Senate Judici-
ary Committee were the first chapter in a dialogue between the
Roberts Court and a newly galvanized Congress over their respective
constitutional turf, or whether they were simply posturing for the
press and the C-SPAN audience. The underlying issue is neither eso-
teric nor technical, though the precise legal questions in many of the
recent federalism cases are. When the Rehnquist federalism revolu-
tion was first announced, both conservatives and liberals perceived in
its supercharged rhetoric and portentous reasoning the seeds of a judi-
cial movement to restore an imagined "Constitution-in-Exile" that the
conservative Supreme Court had brandished to strike down federal
and state social legislation prior to the New Deal.26 This threat has
now become more circumscribed. A strong majority of the current
Court has acknowledged serious flaws in this approach and-at least
within the context of the Commerce Clause-has effectively scuttled
the "first principles" injudiciously proclaimed in 1995.
Unraveling the remaining strands of the Rehnquist "federalism"
campaign is essential to ensure that major twentieth-century social re-
form laws stand as their congressional framers intended. Moreover,
finishing off the Court's retreat is fundamentally necessary to reinstate
the democratic federalism contemplated by the framers of the Consti-
tution itself. Senator Specter's prescription for "rational basis" defer-
ence to Congress descends directly from Chief Justice John Marshall's
1819 bedrock instruction in McCulloch v. Maryland, that courts must
uphold acts of Congress as long as their "end be legitimate" and their
means "appropriate" to their end.27 Both formulae cohere with the
original intent of the founding generation, as well as twentieth-century
Supreme Court precedent pre-dating the 1995 Rehnquist diversion,
that the safeguards of federalism be primarily political and demo-
cratic-not judicial. As stated in The Federalist No. 46, the "ultimate
authority" over both federal and state governments "resides in the
26. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, (Magazine), at 42.
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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people alone," whom the Courts should not "preclude" from assigning
responsibility where "they may discover it to be most due. ' 28 Con-
trary to the Rehnquist Court's half-aborted initiative, American feder-
alism exists primarily to expand democratic options for the people-
not to empower judges to arbitrarily trump the choices of their elected
representatives.
II. THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON FEDERALISM: "THE
HALLMARK AGENDA OF THE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE
REHNQUIST COURT"
A. Chairman Specter's Prehearing Challenge
On July 19, 2005, when President Bush nominated Judge Roberts to
fill Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's seat, Democrats immediately
targeted a 2003 Roberts dissent in which he appeared to question
whether the Commerce Clause justified the application of the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) to a species found in only one state. 29 Rob-
erts, however, quickly squelched this potential line of attack by
mollifying critics such as Judiciary Committee Democrat Senator
Charles Schumer of New York during courtesy calls made in the first
week after President Bush announced his nomination.
Little more was heard about the Commerce Clause as a serious con-
firmation issue until the first week of August when, out of the blue,
Republican Judiciary Committee Chair Specter released a three-page
single-spaced letter to the nominee giving "advance notice" of ques-
tions he planned to ask at the upcoming hearing.30 The letter did not
mention any opinion or statement by Roberts, but rather focused on
the Supreme Court's Lopez and Morrison decisions invalidating pro-
visions of, respectively, the Gun Free School Zones Act and the Vio-
lence Against Women Act under the Commerce Clause. Nor did the
letter directly raise substantive issues about the reach, in principle, of
Congress' Commerce Clause power, as indicated by those two or any
other Supreme Court decisions. Instead, Specter zeroed in on the
constitutional turf-grab registered in these cases. Accusing the Court
of "usurping Congressional authority," he wrote that "members of
Congress are irate about the Court's denigrating and, really, disre-
spectful statements about Congress' competence. ' 31 Focusing particu-
larly on Morrison, Specter condemned the Court for "reject[ing]
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297-98 (James Madison) (Penguin Classics ed., 1987).
29. See Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).




Congressional findings" and ignoring the operative rule of decision
grounded in "decades of precedent" and elaborated in 1968 by Re-
publican Justice John Marshall Harlan that the Court must defer to
Congress if "a rational basis" can be adduced for "a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce. '32 Specter's only
reference to "federalism," the asserted philosophical basis for the
Court's new line of decisions, effectively dismissed it as a sham: "A
reinvigoration of Federalism," he said, "is, of course, the hallmark
agenda of the judicial activism of the Rehnquist Court. 33
Two weeks later, Specter sent a second letter, this time attacking the
Court's recent decisions constraining congressional authority to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment through laws such as the Americans
with Disabilities Act.34 As in the August 8, 2005 Commerce Clause
letter, Specter focused not on the substantive issues or on the philo-
sophical "federalism" issue, but on "[t]he Court's judicial activism in
functioning as a super-legislature. '35 Once again, he assailed the
Court's rejection of congressional factual findings supported by "over-
whelming evidence," and especially for overturning a statutory rem-
edy for which Congress plainly had a rational basis.
In the second letter, Specter targeted the legal standard the Court
had "manufactured" in 1997 for laws implementing authority con-
ferred on Congress to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment by "ap-
propriate legislation." Under this standard, Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation is valid only if "proportional and congruent"
to specific, systematic, demonstrated violations of the substantive pro-
visions of that Amendment. 36 Specter emphasized that this propor-
tional and congruent formula expressly jettisons the rational basis
approach traditionally used to evaluate all federal legislation, tacitly
abandoned as to the Commerce Clause in Lopez and Morrison, and
empowers the federal courts to calibrate the appropriateness of Con-
gress' "ends" and its "means" for achieving them. Specter noted that
Justice Scalia had criticized the "congruent and proportional" test as
"flabby," because it gives the Court too much discretion to reach ap-
parently contradictory results based on the subjective policy prefer-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Letter from Senator Arlen Specter to the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr. (Aug. 23,
2005) [hereinafter Letter of Aug. 23].
35. Id.
36. The rule that Section Five enforcement legislation must demonstrate "proportionality or
[later characterized as "and"] congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to
be achieved" originated in City of Boerne v. Flores, in which the Court invalidated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997).
[Vol. 56:1
FEDERALISM R.I.P.?
ences of individual justices. Specter's principal point was that any
approach-either the congruent and proportional test or Scalia's
bright-line "alternative"-that invalidates a factually and "rationally"
defensible statute like the ADA, converts the Court into an illegiti-
mate "super-legislature."
In launching this attack, Specter's aim was plainly not to initiate a
drive to cripple the Court, though he did refer darkly to President
Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing proposal to counter "activist" Su-
preme Court rejections of New Deal legislation. Nor was he attempt-
ing to put Judge Roberts' eventual confirmation at risk, though he did
claim to speak on behalf of "the Senate's determination to confirm
new justices who will respect Congress' constitutional role. '37 Rather,
in previewing his questions in such florid, angry terms, Specter ap-
pears to have been bent on recruiting Roberts, as the prospective
leader of a new Court, to reverse a misguided gambit undertaken by
his predecessor. He may also have been aiming to jolt his Senate col-
leagues into recognizing-as for a decade they had generally failed to
do-the threat posed by the Rehnquist Court's "federalism" to their
own power and status.
B. Judiciary Committee Members Join Specter's Attack
Soon after the hearings commenced, it became apparent that Spec-
ter had succeeded in energizing his colleagues to defend Congress'
turf. During the hearings, seven of the Committee's eighteen mem-
bers-four Democrats and three Republicans-propounded numer-
ous statements and questions about the Court's federalism
jurisprudence. Echoing Specter's August letters, the questions recog-
nized that the issue at stake was far less states' rights versus federal
power than congressional power vis-A-vis the judiciary. Some mem-
bers emphasized the general importance of respecting congressional
prerogatives. 38 But many questions were detailed and reflected a sur-
prising knowledge of arcane doctrinal byways and a recognition that
37. Letter of Aug. 8, supra note 11.
38. In his first round of questioning, Senator Orin Hatch sought reassurance that Roberts'
lack of Hill experience would not lead him to disrespect Congress in reviewing federal laws,
specifically observing that "along with Senator Biden," he was the primary co-sponsor and au-
thor of the Violence Against Women Act, and that he felt that the Court "overreached" when it
overturned the civil liability provisions of that act in Morrison. Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 163-64 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Transcript]. Hatch ob-
served that Justice Stephen Breyer exhibited deference to Congress in reviewing issues such as
the constitutionality of the criminal sentencing guidelines, based on Breyer's experience in
1979-80 as Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. at 163.
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the federalism debate was not just about the Commerce Clause but
concerned other sources of Congress' constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional authority.
1. Congress' Commerce Clause Authority
In addition to Specter, who pursued the issues elaborated in his let-
ters in similar terms and at considerable length during Roberts' confir-
mation hearings, Senators Feinstein and Schumer criticized the
Rehnquist Court's approach to limiting Congress' Commerce Clause
authority, and they probed Judge Roberts' views on that issue to vary-
ing extents. Feinstein asked whether Roberts generally agreed with
the post-Lopez jurisprudence imposing new constraints on Congress
and, specifically, what his Rancho Viejo dissent portended for the
ESA and other environmental laws.39 Schumer, meanwhile, pushed
Roberts to explain where he stood on the validity of Wickard v. Fil-
burn, the 1942 decision extending Commerce Clause authority to
purely intrastate actions which, if repeated in multiple locations, could
be aggregated to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 40
Schumer also pressed the nominee on whether the Court should gen-
erally defer to Congress on factual and policy determinations that
noncommercial, intrastate activities affect interstate commerce and
are thus subject to federal legislative treatment. 41
2. Congress' Authority to "Enforce" Equal Protection and Due
Process of Law Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Specter's prehearing attack focused its most scathing criticism on
the Court's evisceration of Congress' authority, expressly conferred by
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to "enforce" the Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities provisions in
Section One of the Amendment through "appropriate legislation." In
the hearing, Specter began where he left off, pressing Roberts to ac-
knowledge that the congruent and proportional test, which the Court
had "plucked ... out of thin air," constituted "the very essence" of
judicial "arbitrariness" and "activism."' 42 Specter was joined by fellow
Republican Senator Michael DeWine, who noted the extensive docu-
39. Id. at 225-26, 349, 405-06.
40. Id. at 261-65 (discussing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). Schumer noted that
without the Wickard doctrine, laws such as the ESA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, OSHA,
and the Controlled Substances Act "would go," and he observed that Justice Clarence Thomas,
whom President Bush had consistently held out as a model for his judicial nominees, would
overrule Wickard and other post-New Deal Commerce Clause precedents. Id. at 265.
41. Id. at 264.
42. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 301-02.
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mentation of disability-based discrimination culled from thirteen con-
gressional hearings, and pressed Roberts to discuss whether the
Court's rejection of these findings was consistent with Roberts' own
emphasis on the "limited role" of judges.43
3. Judicial Enforcement of Federal Constitutional and Statutory
Rights
Committee members showed significant interest in the scope of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the Spending
Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment, but also in the often over-
looked issue of whether and how readily private individuals can go to
court to enforce rights created by laws passed by Congress. The
Rehnquist Court had steadily narrowed the occasions on which pri-
vate judicial relief would be available for violations of federal law-
particularly against state and local governments-and it increased
procedural barriers to plaintiffs in those situations where judicial relief
remained, in principle, an option.44 Roberts himself championed this
trend as an appellate lawyer in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush
administrations and as a private practitioner.45 Senators Feingold,
Leahy, and Feinstein tried to determine whether Roberts, as Chief
Justice, would favor closing the courthouse doors still further. They
stressed the importance of suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for benefi-
ciaries of "Medicaid, public housing, child support enforcement, and
43. Id. at 217-19.
44. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding unenforceable "Bill of Rights" provisions of statute pro-
viding funds to support state programs for the developmentally disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because congressional intent to create individual rights was not sufficiently "unambiguous").
The history of the Court's narrowing of § 1983 enforceability from Pennhurst to Gonzaga, and of
kindred restrictions on other aspects of securing relief from federal law violations by private
claimants is reviewed in Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 37 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 64 (2003).
45. As an assistant to President Reagan's first attorney general, William French Smith, Rob-
erts referred in a memo to the "damage" wrought by the Supreme Court's 1981 decision constru-
ing § 1983 to support individual lawsuits against state officials for violating federal statutory
rights, as well as federal constitutional rights. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 415. As
Deputy Solicitor General, Roberts sought to bar Medicaid providers from being able to sue state
governments for underpayments, and individual beneficiaries from vindicating federal statutory
rights in court, in view of an allegedly detailed statutory plan for administrative enforcement.
See Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (arguing the cause for the United States as amicus
curiae); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (same). Roberts, unsuccessful in Wilder,
was successful in Suter, but Congress reversed that result legislatively, preserving the private
right of action in circumstances covered by that case. See Alaska Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs.
v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 424 F.3d 931,.934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). In private prac-
tice, Roberts successfully argued for a narrowing of the standards permitting judicial relief, to
the point where the law stands today. See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. 273.
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public assistance [programs] to enforce those rights in Federal
court, ' 46 and questioned Roberts' view of contentions by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and others that programs providing for federal fund-
ing and state administration, like Medicaid, are "kind of an exclusive
bargain" between the two levels of government with no enforceable
rights for beneficiaries. 47
III. ROBERTS' RESPONSE: ONE CHEER FOR THE FEDERALISM FIVE
Unsurprisingly, since he had received Senator Specter's two pre-
hearing letters, Roberts was well prepared to respond to the senators'
federalism-related concerns. At several points, he seemed to volun-
teer elaborate observations not called for by the questions. In gen-
eral, he did not give a thumping endorsement to his predecessor's
signature initiative.
A. Roberts to Congress: The New Deal Commerce Clause Is Safe
in My Hands
As anticipated, Roberts moved quickly to deflect environmentalist
criticism of his 2003 Rancho Viejo dissent concerning the ESA's pro-
tection of a "hapless toad" species found in only one state.48 Roberts
distinguished his dissent from that of Judge David Sentelle by noting
that his dissent merely suggested that the D.C. Circuit should have
reheard the case en banc, "because there are other ways of sustaining
this Act that don't implicate the concern" voiced by a Fifth Circuit
decision.49 He also attempted to assuage concerns raised by Senator
46. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 247-49, 415-16.
47. Id. at 415, 430. Justices Scalia and Thomas have proposed their contract/third-party bene-
ficiary concept for barring private enforcement of state-administered federal entitlement pro-
grams in various cases. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674-75
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 682-83 (Thomas, J., concurring); Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 349-50 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). A notorious district court decision treating Jus-
tice Scalia's Blessing concurrence as if it were governing law, Westside Mothers v. Haveman, was
reversed by the Sixth Circuit, and rejected by all other circuit courts considering the issue. 133 F.
Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
48. See 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
49. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 226 (referring to GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton,
326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003)). Roberts pointed to similar approaches advanced by the Fourth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit to uphold federal laws protecting endangered species on the basis of
multiple, if in some instances, attenuated impacts on interstate commerce. See Gibbs v. Babbitt,
214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996). Although
Roberts' Senate testimony implied that such an alternative theory would provide justification for
ESA coverage of the arroyo toad at issue in Rancho Viejo, that conclusion might not turn out to
be true. Furthermore, limited though it was, Roberts' dissent does indicate he may have broader




Feinstein about whether his Rancho Viejo dissent might be "a prelude
for [overturning] the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act," ob-
serving that, given "the commercial impact of pollution," these laws
would not present "remotely" as difficult an issue as ESA application
to a purely one-state species. 50
However, the main thrust of his Commerce Clause testimony was to
address concerns-or hopes-that he shared the inclination of some
conservative advocates, academics, and judges to extend the reasoning
of Lopez and Morrison and drastically roll back Congress' post-New
Deal regulatory authority and to lay waste to the vast network of laws
derived from that authority. Roberts seemed intent on sending this
message, without specifying his opinion of recent individual decisions,
by focusing on the Court's 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich. Raich,
he said, meant that those two decisions were not to be viewed as the
start of a counter-revolution:
[Lopez and Morrison were merely] two decisions in the more than
200-year sweep of decisions in which the Supreme Court has ...
recognized extremely broad authority on Congress's part, going all
the way back to Gibbons v. Ogden and Chief Justice John Marshall,
when those Commerce Clause decisions were important in binding
the Nation together as a single commercial unit.51
To drive the point home, he twice stated that Raich meant that Lopez
and Morrison did not "junk all the cases that came before. '52
Roberts' "did-not-junk" line may initially seem like a relatively in-
nocuous truism. In context, his formulation was tantamount to con-
firming that conservative observers were correct when they lamented
that Raich meant the "end of the Federalism Revolution" proclaimed
in Lopez. 53 From the beginning, Lopez was significant, not for its lim-
ited holding-the federal statute at issue duplicated laws already on
the books in fifty states and lacked any provision requiring even a
nominal connection to interstate commerce 54-but for Chief Justice
50. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 406. Senator Schumer voiced similar concerns, noting
that if extended, Roberts' logic in Rancho Viejo might threaten, in addition to the ESA, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, OSHA, the Controlled Substances Act, and "prohibitions against per-
sonal possessions of biological weapons." Id. at 265.
51. Id. at 225. Referring to Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden could
have been intended to underscore an expansive view of the Commerce Clause because Gibbons
is often characterized as one of the broadest expressions of the commerce power. See Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
52. Interestingly, Roberts made his "junking" remark twice, both times in the course of failing
to respond to invitations from conservative Republican senators to endorse Lopez as a "healthy"
reminder that that there are limits to Congress' "enumerated" powers. Roberts Transcript, supra
note 38, at 271-72, 356.
53. Ponnuru, supra note 14.
54. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
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Rehnquist's portentous rhetoric. Rehnquist's majority opinion pro-
claimed its return to "first principles," reviving the primacy of "enu-
merated" congressional powers, and categorically walling off
"traditionally" or inherently "local" activities from Congress' reach.
It was these rhetorical thunderbolts that provoked passionate and
lengthy dissents from Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg,
as well as frantic opposition from liberal observers55 and equally in-
tense enthusiasm from conservative legal intelligentsia on the bench,
in academia, and in think tanks.56
A decade later, Raich relied heavily on the aggregation "methodol-
ogy" that Lopez scorned as the basis for upholding federal prohibition
of possessing or growing marijuana for medicinal purposes as sanc-
tioned by California state law.57 A 6-2 majority, including Justices
Kennedy and Scalia of the former Federalism Five, held this prohibi-
tion consistent with the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding multiple
factors that under Rehnquist's Lopez opinion might have been ex-
pected to favor a contrary result. In common-sense terms, both the
aim of the law and the conduct at issue in the case were
"noneconomic"; under Lopez's approach, aggregating the effects of
the plaintiff's personal use should have been barred. In addition, the
regulation of the practice of medicine was traditionally a state mat-
ter-an important Lopez-denominated factor disfavoring federal reg-
ulatory authority. 58 Other important factors were also present: the
fact that the medicinal value of the marijuana for the patients involved
in the case was painfully apparent; state legislation approved and reg-
ulated the practice; Congress had not contemplated this type of state-
sanctioned medicinal use and procedure when it enacted pertinent
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act; and there was little if any
evidence that proscription of such state programs was necessary to
achieve the aims of the Act. The Court ignored or discounted all
these elements, despite their prominence in the framework outlined in
Lopez.59
55. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 26; Simon Lazarus, The Most Dangerous Branch?, THE AT-
LANTIC ONLINE, June 2002, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200206/lazarus.
56. See generally Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 506-10 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting);
MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT COULD HAPPEN (1999);
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
57. Rehnquist's exposition of Commerce Clause doctrine provided that federal laws covering
"noneconomic" activities must, to be valid, show a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce
without "hav[ing] to pile inference upon inference"-i.e., without resorting to "aggregation"
methodology. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
58. See id. at 565.
59. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220-23 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (elaborating
on the reasons why the factors stressed in Lopez were ignored by the majority).
[Vol. 56:1
FEDERALISM R.I.P.?
As interpreted by Roberts, Raich put a revisionist gloss on Lopez,
reading out Rehnquist's radical devolutionist rhetoric and adopting
something like Justice Kennedy's Lopez concurrence. The gist of
Kennedy's opinion was that "enough was enough." The Gun Free
School Zones Act was just too big a stretch-at least if Congress
didn't bother to do its homework and spell out some sort of connec-
tion, however tenuous, to interstate commerce. But Kennedy empha-
sized that the Commerce Clause gave Congress whatever power it
needed to assure the strength and health of the national economy. 60
In effect, as Justice O'Connor's Raich dissent tartly observed, her col-
leagues in 2005 had retroactively trivialized Lopez, so that it now rep-
resented "nothing more than a drafting guide. '61 Roberts expressly
confirmed O'Connor's spin. He told the Judiciary Committee that the
only constitutional defect that Lopez identified in the Gun Free
School Zones Act was the statute's lack of "a requirement that the
firearm be transported in interstate commerce. ' 62 He went on to de-
scribe this as a "fix" that "would be easy to meet in most cases [involv-
ing guns]."'63
Roberts also seemed to minimize the impact of Rehnquist's doctri-
nal invention in Lopez that Congress faces an especially high burden
when it purports to link interstate commerce with "noneconomic" ac-
tivities or "traditionally" local subject-matter areas. 64 In answering a
question from Senator Schumer regarding whether Congress can reg-
ulate "purely local" activities if it finds that they "exert a substantial
effect on interstate commerce," Roberts noted Rehnquist's rule that
the effects of such activities can be "aggregate[d]" only if they are
"commercial in nature. '65 Nevertheless, he did not seem to feel that
Rehnquist's distinction between commercial and noncommercial ac-
tivities had much bite, in terms of Congress' discretion to identify "ef-
fects" on interstate commerce. He readily agreed with Schumer that
Congress could regulate noncommercial cloning because of its poten-
tial commercial impact. 66 When Senator Feinstein asked, in regard to
60. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569, 572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 349.
63. Id. One of the few facts pertinent to issues arising during his testimony of which Roberts
appeared not to be aware is that Congress actually enacted a "fix" similar to his recommenda-
tion. The senators also appeared unaware that they had voted for this "fix."
64. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.
65. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 439-40.
66. Id. at 440.
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the statute struck down in Lopez, "at what point does crime influence
commerce?" Roberts responded, "I think it does. '67
B. Roberts on Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Authority
1. Scalia's "Originalism" Misstates the Framers' (Original) Intent
Senators DeWine and Specter pressed Roberts to acknowledge that
his emphasis on judicial "modesty" and deference to Congress re-
quired that he repudiate the Court's current "activist" approach to
scrutinizing laws passed to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment, as
exemplified in Garrett, Kimel, and Morrison. What did the senators
get for their effort?
Roberts' most significant statement about the Fourteenth Amend-
ment concerned an issue never directly raised during the hearing, but
which he was evidently eager to answer. He discussed, and succinctly
dismissed, the brand of "originalist" constitutional theory promoted
by Justice Scalia-namely, that broad and vague constitutional terms
should be "strictly" confined by reference to societal practices extant
when the provision was drafted. Instead, Roberts volunteered his
opinion on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
There are some who may think they're being originalists who will
tell you, well, the problem they were getting at were the rights of
the newly freed slaves, and so that's all that the Equal Protection
Clause applies to. But, in fact, they didn't write the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in such narrow terms. They wrote more generally. That
may have been a particular problem motivating them, but they
chose to use broader terms, and we should take them at their word,
so that it is perfectly appropriate to apply the Equal Protection
Clause to issues of gender and other types of discrimination beyond
the racial discrimination that was obviously the driving force behind
it. 68
Roberts' critique of Scalia's "originalist" construction of the Equal
Protection Clause might have a bearing on his approach to Congress'
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The most recent, and
probably most conspicuous, occasion on which Scalia invoked this
originalist construction was in his 2003 dissent in Tennessee v. Lane.69
Scalia asserted that henceforth he would vote to strike down all "pro-
phylactic" legislation purporting to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
67. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
69. 541 U.S. 509, 554-65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ment, except legislation targeted at the "original" spur for adopting
the Amendment-systematic, state-sponsored race discrimination. 70
Thus, for example, Title II of the ADA, which addresses discrimina-
tion against citizens with disabilities, and the VAWA, which prevents
and remedies discrimination against women, would be flatly unconsti-
tutional. No basis offered by Congress-whether rational, congruent,
proportional, or otherwise-could prevent their invalidation.71
Roberts' declaration that nonracial forms of discrimination have
equal status as appropriate targets for congressional enforcement ac-
tion does not, of course, mean that he accepted Specter's invitation to
repudiate the doctrinal obstacles the Rehnquist Court imposed on
Congress when it seeks to draft Section Five enforcement legislation.
However, it does seem fair to observe that this was the impression he
sought to convey. Why else would he have gone so visibly out of his
way to distance himself from Scalia's contention that, in principle, the
Equal Protection Clause has little force when applied to gender, disa-
bility, or age-based discrimination?
2. "Congruent and Proportional" Still in Play?
With respect to judicial deference to congressional fact-finding,
Roberts did offer a boiler-plate acknowledgement of Congress' supe-
rior institutional competence, by noting that courts "can't sit and hear
witness after witness," nor "make the policy judgments about what
type of legislation is necessary in light of the findings that are made." 72
70. Id. at 564-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Prophylactic" legislation, as used by Justices Scalia
and Kennedy here, means legislation proscribing practices that are not themselves violations of
the substantive provisions of the amendment-e.g., that do not inherently constitute unconstitu-
tional discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause-or prescribing affirmative pro-
cedures or practices in order to generally remedy a pattern of such violations, or to prevent them
from occurring in the future. If limited to redressing actual, specific, proven violations, as Justice
Scalia advocates, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment would authorize little more than
federal tort legislation for constitutional violations.
71. Scalia's analysis, shared by Justices Kennedy and Thomas in their dissent in the same case
purporting to apply the "congruent and proportional" test to invalidate Title II, would put dis-
crimination driven by negative stereotyping, as distinguished from consciously intentional dis-
crimination, beyond the reach of Congress' Section Five authority. Id. at 564 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Senator DeWine objected to the Court's rejection in Garrett of the fact that Con-
gress "found that [disability-based] discrimination flowed from stereotypic assumptions about
the disabled, as well as, quote, 'purposeful unequal treatment."' Roberts Transcript, supra note
38, at 218. During the oral argument in Lane, Justice Ginsburg flagged this problem, in objecting
to assurances from other members that, even if Congress could not redress the alleged violation
present in that case through the remedy provided by the ADA, other, more "congruent or pro-
portional" means could be employed; Ginsburg noted that the proposed test for finding a viola-
tion was so stringent that it was problematic whether, in the real world, one could ever be found.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (No. 02-1667).
72. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 218-19.
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But while he observed that deference to Congress on such points "has
a solid basis," he declined to criticize the Federalism Five for failing to
show appropriate deference, or to state whether or how he would han-
dle such situations differently.
He may, however, have offered something of a concession by ad-
ding that the dismissive approach to congressional factual findings in
Kimel, Garrett, and Morrison may be viewed as having been altered
by Lane and Hibbs:73
[W]here the Court did defer to the fact-finding.., and particularly
in the Hibbs case focused on the legislative recognition based on its
examination of the factual record developed at hearings about the
statute that was at issue there, and the particular approach that they
were taking to remedy discrimination under the [Fourteenth]
Amendment, which is the authority that Congress has. 74
Perhaps more significantly, Roberts went on to suggest that not only
the nondeferential treatment of congressional findings, but the "pro-
portional and congruent" standard for scrutinizing Section Five legis-
lation had been put in play by two more recent decisions. Observing
that Justice Scalia had broken ranks with the supporters of the congru-
ent and proportional test, Roberts said, "[a]ny area of the law where
Justice Scalia is changing his mind, has got to be one that is particu-
larly difficult, and one that I think is appropriately regarded as still
evolving and emerging. '75 He continued in the same vein:
I don't know if the more recent cases in Lane and Hibbs represent a
swinging of the pendulum away from cases like Garrett and Kimel
on the other side, or if it's simply part of the process of the Court
trying to come to rest with an approach in this area.
But it is an area that the Court has found difficult, and just as a
general matter, I think when you get to the point of reweighing con-
gressional findings, that starts to look more like a legislative func-
tion, and the courts need to be very careful as they get into that
area, to make sure that they're interpreting the law and not making
it.
7 6
By questioning the precedential force of the key cases establishing
Rehnquist's Section Five jurisprudence, Roberts sought to placate
Senator DeWine and other Judiciary Committee members who ob-
jected to that jurisprudence, without making any specific commit-
ments. But DeWine and his colleagues have some basis for expecting
73. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
74. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 219.
75. Id.
76. Id. Given Roberts' elaborate exposition of factors that militate in favor of reducing a
particular decision or rule's precedential weight, his casting of doubt on the force of congruent
and proportional may take on added potential significance.
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Roberts to acknowledge conflict between his professed reverence for
judicial restraint and his predecessor's agenda for undermining Con-
gress' capacity for remedying discrimination based on age, gender, dis-
ability, and other immutable factors. 77
C. Shrink the Strike Zone and Close the Courthouse Door: Roberts
on Citizens' Court Access to Enforce Federal Rights
However flexible his views on Congress' authority to enact broad
social legislation, Roberts appeared considerably more rigid about the
ability of individual citizens to enforce those laws in court, and about
Congress' capacity to empower them to do so. The Rehnquist Court
has, over the past century, erratically but persistently created new ob-
stacles to plaintiffs seeking to enforce federal statutory and constitu-
tional rights. Roberts himself had seemingly applauded these
courthouse door-closing efforts, and as an advocate participated in a
number of them. Many such private enforcement actions are directed
at state and local governments and officials; Rehnquist Court deci-
sions paring back such authority have frequently been justified by ref-
erence to imperatives of federalism.
In his Senate Judiciary testimony, Roberts did affirm that current
law does not require that Congress expressly authorize an individual
to bring a cause of action for a given statute to be enforceable in
court.78 He also rejected the radical view promoted by certain lower
federal court judges, as well as conservative academics, that laws
passed pursuant to the Spending Clause are not "laws" entitled to en-
forcement as "the supreme law of the land," and so cannot create le-
gal rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.79 Further, he indicated
that current law does not accept a similar view promoted vigorously
by Justices Scalia and Thomas that Spending Clause-based grants are
merely "contracts" between the federal and state governments, which
individual beneficiaries-"third-party beneficiaries" in the Scalia-
Thomas contract-law analogy-cannot, without specific authorization
77. Similarly, Roberts gave a glint of hope to Specter when, in response to a prolonged ha-
rangue to jettison the congruent and proportional standard ("which has no grounding in the
Constitution, no grounding in the Federalist Papers, no grounding in the history of the country"),
Roberts noted that a case on the 2005 docket of the Court could present an opportunity to revisit
that test, and if he is confirmed, he "would approach that with an open mind and consider the
arguments." Id. at 302.
78. Id. at 430.
79. See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561-62 (E.D. Mich. 2001),
rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
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in the "contract," enforce in court, regardless of Congress' "intent." 80
Under the third-party beneficiary theory or the not-the-supreme-law-
of-the-land theory, requirements in Spending Clause statutes like
Medicaid would neither be enforceable as rights "secured by the Con-
stitution and laws" of the United States under § 1983, nor in an action
to enjoin ongoing state violation of federal law under the Supremacy
Clause.
When confronted with his career-long record of opposing individual
rights enforcement, Roberts had a simple response: the availability of
private judicial relief turns on congressional intent. Though he ac-
knowledged that the law does not require an express provision of a
right to sue, he insisted that the problems of trying to divine intent
would be eliminated if Congress would make itself clear. Roberts ar-
gued this point to Senator Leahy:
[T]he issue is not whether [beneficiaries] should be able to sue or
not. The issue is whether Congress intended them to be able to sue
or not. The issue doesn't even come up if Congress would simply
spell out in the legislation we intended these individuals to have the
right to sue in Federal court.81
Roberts' "Congress' intent" strategy glossed over almost all of the
pertinent questions about the direction and ultimate destination of the
Rehnquist Court's lengthy campaign to narrow privately initiated ju-
dicial enforcement of federal rights. In effect, he deflected back onto
Congress the Committee's criticisms of the Rehnquist Court. While
an effective debater's ploy, his argument was beside the point. It
was-if not disingenuous-certainly less than candid.
First, the pertinent question is when courts should entertain citizen
suits even though Congress has not made its "intent" on this point
clear. Obviously, when Congress does "spell out" provisions for pri-
vate enforcement actions, the courts must comply with that require-
ment as with any other legal requirement. 82 The doctrinal area in
80. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 429-30. The Scalia-Thomas "third-party beneficiary"
theory originated in Scalia's concurring opinion in Blessing, in which Justice Kennedy joined,
and was restated in opinions concurring in the judgment by Scalia and Thomas in Walsh. Bless-
ing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am.
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674-75 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 675-83 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
81. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 416. Roberts repeated essentially the same argument
in exchanges with Senators Feingold and Feinstein. Id. at 248, 430.
82. However, the Rehnquist Court's hostility to private enforcement has driven it to create
significant roadblocks to such actions even where Congress does "spell out" its authorization.
For example, the Court has dramatically broadened a concept of state "sovereign immunity"
"plucked ...out of thin air," in Senator Specter's terms, to bar suits to enforce Fourteenth




which the court access issue has been most frequently and fiercely liti-
gated during the Rehnquist years-and the area on which the Senate
Judiciary Committee focused in questioning Roberts-has been the
scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Reconstruction Era statute imposes
civil liability on any person who "under color of any [state] statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, subjects... any person.., to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws [of the United States]." In 1980, the Court
made clear the obvious: that the phrase "and laws" literally means
what it says, and provides a vehicle to enforce rights secured by fed-
eral "laws" and by the Constitution.8 3 Section 1983 is the principal
avenue for private actions to enforce federal statutory requirements
against state and local governments in safety-net, civil rights, and
other statutes that do not themselves contain an express provision for
a right of action.
If the availability of the courts for private enforcement of federal
requirements in fact depended on whether Congress "spelled out"
such authority, § 1983 would be dead letter law. Although the Court
has considerably narrowed § 1983, it has not yet gone that far. Rob-
erts acknowledged as much in the hearing. 84
In fairness, Roberts did not so much misstate the law as provide a
superficial and misleading account of how it is applied. The case law
often speaks of congressional intent, but the recent criteria the Court
has developed to sort out whether Congress "intended" to authorize
private court enforcement have little or nothing to do with Congress'
actual state of mind when it passed the law in question. These crite-
ria-which have constantly been subjected to changes of emphasis,
ordering, and wording-encompass such objective inquiries as
whether the requirement giving rise to a violation is targeted to bene-
fit the plaintiff, whether it is not so "vague and amorphous" that
courts cannot realistically administer it, and whether it is couched in
"mandatory" rather than "precatory" terms.85 In Gonzaga University
v. Doe, the Court's most recent attempt to narrow § 1983 right of ac-
tion authority, the Court added a requirement that the statute in ques-
tion must "unambiguously" use "rights-creating" language.86 In
practice, this inquiry is an arbitrary extrapolation from the words Con-
gress chose rather than an assessment of its unexpressed and often
83. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
84. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 248-49.
85. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 522-23 (1990);
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 426-30 (1987).
86. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290-91 (2002).
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indiscernible "intent. ' 87 For example, the Third Circuit held that not
all requirements of the Medicaid program are judicially enforceable
because the Medicaid Act contains no "rights-creating language" ap-
plicable to the entire statutory scheme. 88 The court held, however,
that specific requirements to provide institutional care for mentally
retarded individuals can be judicially enforced because Congress spec-
ified that state Medicaid plans "must provide" such services "for all
[eligible] individuals"-phrasing which the court found to satisfy Gon-
zaga's "rights-creating" standard.89 It seems unlikely that Roberts,
who argued for the prevailing party in Gonzaga and participated in
several of its predecessor Supreme Court cases, is unaware of the ex-
tent to which the search for congressional "intent" professed by appli-
cable doctrine is, in practice, a fiction.
Further, the criteria employed in these right-of-action inquiries in-
clude tests containing an explicit bias against authorizing private suits,
regardless of Congress' actual intent. The Court's insistence on "un-
ambiguous rights-creating" language to limit federal statutory provi-
sions that can trigger § 1983 actions descends from similar "clear
statement," "unmistakable intent," and "clear and manifest intention"
screens, which are also applied to obstruct private actions against state
and local governments in other procedural contexts. All these func-
tionally equivalent formulae are designed, not to aid in ascertaining
Congress' actual "intent," but to "preserve" what is routinely charac-
terized-without analysis-as the "balance" between the state and
federal governments. 90 In fact, preserving "balance," however fictive,
is beside the point. As several observers have noted, these rules
"function not as 'tie-breakers' that might be justified on various insti-
tutional or even prudential grounds, but rather as initial presumptions
87. Recently, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook contended that there is a logical re-
sponse to the apparent "oxymoron-how can an 'implied' right of action be phrased in 'clear
and unambiguous terms,' when statutory silence is what poses the question ... ?" McCready v.
White, 417 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2005). He noted that the "rights-creating language" must be
"clear and unambiguous," despite Congress' silence on the right of action issue. Id. Technically,
Judge Easterbrook may be correct, but in practice, since the only significance of "rights-creat-
ing" status is authorization for right-of-action authority, the distinction he suggests is, unsurpris-
ingly, nearly always one without a difference.
88. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004).
89. Id. at 191 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)(15) (2000)). In Sabree, then-Cir-
cuit Judge Samuel Alito's concurrence gratuitously observed that "future Supreme Court cases"
may go further and reject § 1983 suits to enforce Medicaid altogether. Id. at 194 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
90. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (citing and linking cases in
different but related contexts involving private suits against state and local governments).
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that erect potential barriers to the straightforward effectuation of leg-
islative intent. ' 91
As an additional monkey wrench tossed into Congress' machinery
for conferring right of action authority, these rules require that the
"clear statement" or "unambiguous" language count only if it appears
"in the language of the statute" in question.92 In other words, it does
not matter if Congress might reasonably have assumed, given the con-
temporaneous legal context, that a particular law could be privately
enforced against states or localities. For example, would not the Re-
construction Era Congress that passed the 1871 law containing § 1983
have assumed that state or municipal defendants would be its most
obvious targets, since the driving goal of that legislation and other leg-
islation to enforce the Reconstruction amendments was to end dis-
criminatory and other abusive state practices, especially in the South?
More recently, as discussed below, prevailing law would have given
Congress reason to anticipate the availability of private court access
under (subsequently curtailed) implied right-of-action or other court-
created doctrines. In these cases, Congress might well have failed to
specify that particular provisions would be enforceable in court
against state or local governments because it would have seemed su-
perfluous or unimportant to do so.
As acknowledged by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his 2002 Gonzaga
opinion, his Court's persistent narrowing of § 1983 has been a subset
of this broader campaign to cut back on court access to enforce fed-
eral rights.93 Throughout most of the twentieth century, the law
clearly recognized a contrary presumption in favor of "implying" a
right of action to enforce federal laws generally.94 But in 1975, in Cort
v. Ash, the Court effectively reversed that presumption and intro-
duced a multi-factor test, similar to those used to screen § 1983 claims,
91. Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1968-73 (1994) (collecting cases and commentaries). For an especially
telling critique, see Justice Stevens' dissent in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank, which spotlights the Federalism Five's invention of a new, unan-
ticipatable barrier to legislation carefully drafted to surmount the hurdle the Court had previ-
ously imposed:
It is quite unfair for the Court to strike down Congress' Act based on an absence of
findings supporting a requirement this Court had not yet articulated. The legislative
history ... makes it abundantly clear that Congress was attempting to hurdle the then-
most-recent barrier this Court had erected in the Eleventh Amendment course-the
"clear statement" rule of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
527 U.S. 627, 654 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002).
93. Id. at 289.




to assess whether to "imply" a right of action from a given statutory
scheme. 95 After Cort v. Ash, the flood of such federal cases quickly
shrank to a trickle, and has now all but completely dried up.
In his confirmation hearing, Roberts invoked this history in a man-
ner that underscores his awareness that the Court's formulae for di-
vining congressional "intent" to authorize private rights of action are
actually slanted not to divine Congress' actual purposes, but to shut
the courthouse door as much as possible. Analogizing the current
confusion over the applicability of § 1983 to "the issue of implied
rights of action in the past," he testified that "they were doing case
after case after case and they finally adopted an approach in the early
1980s that said, look, we're not going to imply rights of action anymore.
Congress, if you want somebody to have a right of action, just say so. ",96
In fact, the Court did not say any such thing. But that is evidently
what Chief Justice Roberts believes the Court meant; he knows that is
the result of the implied right-of-action cases-an approach which he
evidently believes is applicable to issues of court access under § 1983.
Finally, in constantly reformulating the applicable tests, stiffening
old requirements, and inventing new ones, the Court has in effect
been "moving the goal posts" to defeat congressional expectations.
To adapt a metaphor that Roberts himself introduced in his opening
statement, the Court has repeatedly shrunk the strike zone to thwart
the reasonable expectations of the Congress that enacted the provi-
sion being construed.97 It has steadily, if erratically and unpredictably,
upped the ante for Congress, changing priorities among or interpreta-
tions of the vague terms in its multi-factor tests. Hence, not only are
the Court's screens to obstruct private judicial enforcement, while
phrased and justified in terms of "congressional intent," actually
aimed at promoting policies (such as sheltering state and local officials
and obstructing citizen access to courts), but they are independent of
Congress' actual "intent." By unpredictably ratcheting up the applica-
ble procedural barriers and-most egregiously-retroactively apply-
ing them to congressional actions taken decades before the Court's
decisions, the Court has not only rendered Congress' true intent irrel-
evant, but has in practice made it difficult if not impossible to fulfill.
95. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (stating the new approach as follows: whether the plaintiff is a
member of a class of persons specially benefited by the statute; whether there is any indication of
legislative intent to create a right of action remedy; whether a right of action remedy is "consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme;" and whether state law has tradition-
ally provided such a remedy).
96. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 294 (emphasis added).
97. Roberts' prescription for judicial "modesty" cast the judge in the role of the "umpire,"
who "calls balls and strikes" but does not actually play the game. Id. at 255-56.
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This was not always so. Initially, the Court sought to avoid retroac-
tive imposition of its new Cort v. Ash criteria, which in themselves
were broadly supported by liberal and conservative justices. In 1982,
Justice Stevens made the common-sense observation that, if the goal is
to effectuate Congress' intent, "[w]hen Congress acts in a statutory
context in which an implied private remedy has already been recog-
nized by the courts .... the question is whether Congress intended to
preserve the pre-existing remedy." 98
But that notion of respecting Congress' actual intent vis-a-vis pri-
vate enforcement authority didn't survive succeeding rounds of Re-
publican appointments to the Court. In 2001, Justice Scalia dismissed
Stevens' 1982 solicitude as a relic of the discarded ancien regime of
presumptive hospitality to federal rights of action. Scalia shrugged off
1980s precedents honoring the "'expectations' that the enacting Con-
gress had formed 'in light of the contemporary legal context."' 99 He
brusquely denied that the Court had ever given such expectations,
however reasonable, "dispositive weight." 100
In sum, during Roberts' confirmation hearing, when the nominee
asserted that the disposition of efforts by private citizens to enforce
federal rights depends on what Congress intended, the Committee
could productively have responded with a volley of follow-up ques-
tions.101 They could have started by asking whether he really meant
to honor what ordinary people and legislators understand by "con-
gressional intent," or whether this was just a cover for defeating Con-
gress' actual, reasonable "expectations," as Justice Scalia effectively
acknowledged. The Committee might have demanded whether Rob-
erts believed the current "gotcha" approach is consistent with his own
professed commitment to judicial modesty and deference to Con-
gress-as members did in regard to other facets of the Rehnquist
"federalism" agenda involving flagrant snubs of Congress. Broadly
stated, those are the real questions concerning the future for citizen-
initiated federal rights enforcement on the Roberts Court. On those
98. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-79 (1982) (em-
phasis added).
99. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-88 (2001).
100. Id. at 287. In addition to Merrill Lynch, other Supreme Court decisions honoring con-
gressional "expectations" regarding an implied private right of action, and derided by Justice
Scalia in Sandoval, include Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) and Thompson
v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
101. On other "federalism"-related issues, Committee members pursued the nominee with
pointed follow-up questions that penetrated beyond his initial, comparatively superficial an-
swers. Understandably, the "right of action" area has been such a doctrinal swamp, overgrown
with so many arcane rulings and issues, that senators found it unappealing to press Roberts, a
manifest expert, too far.
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questions, the confirmation hearing did little to clarify Roberts' prior
record-a record that is inconclusive but on the whole unpromising.
IV. THE ALITO HEARINGS: ONE STEP BACK?
Four months after John Roberts was confirmed as Chief Justice, and
three months after Harriet Miers' nomination was withdrawn, the Ju-
diciary Committee held five days of hearings on President Bush's
nomination of Third Circuit Judge Samuel Alito to replace the retiring
Justice O'Connor. On federalism issues, the committee members
largely reprised their Roberts hearing performances. Republican Sen-
ators Specter and DeWine used Alito's hearing, just as they had used
the earlier proceeding, to attack the Rehnquist federalism jurispru-
dence for "denigrating" Congress. They defended laws impaired by
that jurisprudence, like the VAWA and the ADA, as "rationally" con-
nected to constitutional sources of congressional authority. In partic-
ular, Senator Specter excoriated the Court's congruent and
proportional formula for evaluating Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment legislation as "pulled out of the thin air."'10 2
As with Roberts, Democratic Senators Schumer, Feinstein, and
Biden likewise probed the second nominee for his views on the Rehn-
quist Court's doctrines limiting congressional authority under both the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than sim-
ply ask Alito his opinion of Rehnquist Court decisions, they focused
on certain opinions he himself had written. During his fifteen-year
Third Circuit career, Alito authored a number of opinions signifi-
cantly more provocative than any written by John Roberts during his
comparatively brief two-year tenure on the D.C. Circuit. In a 1996
case, United States v. Rybar, an Alito dissent embraced the same ag-
gressive interpretation of Lopez that, in 2005, a 6-3 Supreme Court
majority rejected in Raich, and that Roberts rejected in his confirma-
tion hearing. 103 In Rybar, Alito read Lopez, which invalidated Con-
gress' effort to criminalize the possession of handguns within one
thousand yards of a school, to prohibit Congress from banning traffic
in and possession of machine guns. In uncharacteristically caustic
terms, he mocked his colleagues in the Rybar majority (and by impli-
cation, the six prior circuit court decisions that shared their interpreta-
tion, subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Raich), in
102. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong., 2d Sess. 477 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Transcript].
103. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286-94 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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substance "strictly limit[ing] [Lopez] to its own peculiar circum-
stances," thereby turning it into a "constitutional freak.' 10 4
Roberts had taken pains to distance himself from suggestions by
others that Lopez portended a radical contraction of the post-New
Deal Commerce Clause. Alito did not follow Roberts' script. He did
not seize the opportunity presented by the hearing, and the Court's
recent backtracking in Hibbs, Lane, and Raich, to disavow the more
aggressive implications of the Federalism Five's early thunderbolts.
He might have acknowledged that Raich had definitively resolved his
dispute with his Rybar colleagues in their favor, making Lopez pre-
cisely the aberrant "freak" he described in his dissent. But he did not.
Both before and after the hearing, Senator Schumer asked whether
and how Raich affected his reading of Lopez; Judge Alito declined to
provide an answer-even an equivocal one. When Senator Specter
demanded that Alito explain "what's wrong" with the deferential "ra-
tional basis" test for evaluating the constitutionality of federal laws,
and whether he would "subscribe to that test over the proportionate
and congruence test," he demurred. 10 5 He did acknowledge that there
was "ferment" in this area, and that some of the Court's decisions, in
particular Hibbs, had not been predictable. 10 6 But unlike Roberts, he
said nothing to criticize the soundness of the Federalism Five's strict
scrutiny of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, nor to
suggest that the precedential force of its doctrinal approach might be
in question. 10 7
V. WHAT NEXT: DOWN WITH FEDERALISM, UP WITH
"MODESTY"... OR RENEWED ACTIvIsM?
What does the testimony of nominees Roberts and Alito, set against
the backdrop of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, indicate about
the status and historical significance of the Rehnquist Court's federal-
104. Id. at 287 (Alito, J., dissenting).
105. Alito Transcript, supra note 102, at 478.
106. Id.
107. Alito did, however, indicate that he probably does not subscribe to Justice Scalia's even
more drastic circumscription of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority:
[Olne argument that has been made which would represent a very narrow interpreta-
tion of congressional power, and this is basically... the position that Justice Scalia took
in the dissent that you mentioned, is that Congress' authority doesn't extend any fur-
ther than remedying actual violations of the 14th Amendment, that . . . Congress
doesn't have additional authority to enact prophylactic measures outside of the area of
race, which Justice Scalia would treat differently and recognize broader authority be-
cause of the historical origin ....
Id. at 477-78 (emphasis added).
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ism crusade? And what are federalism's prospects on the Roberts
Court? The following is my reading of the tea leaves.
A. No Revival of the Pre-New Deal Commerce (or
Spending) Clause
The big question underlying the early, frantic federalism debates
was whether the Lopez majority would extend Rehnquist's argument
far enough to reach Federalist Society co-founder Gary Lawson's con-
clusion that "[tihe post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitu-
tional."10 The two constitutional bulwarks of the expansion of
federal power decried by Lawson and his allies were the Commerce
Clause, extensively discussed in Roberts' confirmation hearing, and
the Spending Clause, which was barely mentioned in the hearing.
With respect to the former, as we have seen, neither the new Chief
Justice nor other members of the current Court, with the possible ex-
ceptions of Justices Thomas and Alito, show any appetite for reviving
the pre-New Deal Commerce Clause.
With respect to the Spending Clause-Congress' Article I authority
to raise and spend revenue for "the general welfare of the United
States," which undergirds Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and
many other programs-the Court has broadly construed Congress'
discretion to impose conditions in the form of binding legal rules on
state and local government recipients of federal funds. The opinion in
a key Spending Clause case, South Dakota v. Dole, was written by
none other than Chief Justice Rehnquist. 10 9 Post-New Deal interpre-
tation of the Spending Clause gives Congress enormous leverage over
state governments, and Congress exercises that leverage on a vast
scale. Nevertheless, Rehnquist's Dole opinion made no mention of
the categorical limits he attempted to draw around Congress' Com-
merce Clause authority in Lopez. Since Lopez, the Court has de-
clined opportunities to import Lopez-style federalism into Spending
Clause jurisprudence. 0
108. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1231 (1994).
109. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a statutory requirement that state governments accepting
federal highway funds must enact federally prescribed age limits on alcohol purchases).
110. The leading recent case is Sabri v. United States, in which the Court upheld the federal
statute proscribing bribery of officials of any state or local government that receives federal
funds-as a practical matter, all state and local governments. 541 U.S. 600 (2004). Justice
Thomas concurred in the judgment, but argued at some length why "the Court's approach seems




Plainly, during his hearing, the new Chief Justice gave no comfort to
advocates of restoring a pre-New Deal Constitution-in-Exile by gut-
ting Congress' Commerce and Spending Clause powers. In addition
to his responses to Commerce Clause questions, Roberts repeatedly
condemned the "era" of Lochner v. New York, the 1905 decision that
symbolized the early twentieth-century Supreme Court's drive to in-
validate social legislation on Commerce Clause, Due Process, and
other grounds.' A further clue may be his response to questions on
the Court's 5-4 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London." 2 In that case,
the Court held that using eminent domain to force transfers of private
property to new private owners for "economic development" consti-
tuted, in principle, a legitimate "public purpose" under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Libertarian conservatives have sought to
demonize Kelo in an attempt to galvanize public support for stronger
constitutional protection of property rights. 1 3 But rather than take
Senator Brownback's invitation to join the critics of this much-
maligned decision, Roberts implicitly defended it as an example of
judicial restraint, empowering legislatures to define the proper bound-
aries of eminent domain authority.11 4
Justice Alito's record on the bench and his confirmation hearing
provide reason to believe that he could join Justice Thomas in arguing
for a return to the pre-New Deal Commerce Clause. Were that scena-
rio to materialize, it would seem likely that the two would also find a
common cause in tightening the scant current limits on Congress' au-
thority to attach prescriptive conditions on funds transferred to state
and local governments, or private groups or individuals.115 But there
are strong reasons to discount this possibility as a significant factor
shaping the Roberts Court's jurisprudence. First, Thomas and Alito
will be alone; on the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority,
two members of the original Federalism Five defected in Raich, and
111. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 162, 270. Asked to name an example of "immod-
esty," Roberts stated that "the clearest juxtaposition would be the cases from the Lochner era."
Id. at 408.
112. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
113. See, e.g., TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 21ST-
CENTURY AMERICA (2006).
114. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 285-86.
115. In his hearing, Alito did find occasion to describe the limitations on Spending Clause
conditions drawn by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1987 in Dole. By emphasizing that states are
bound by such conditions only if they are "germane" to the overall purpose of the grant of funds,
and only if Congress provides a "clear statement" of the nature of the conditions, Alito might
have signaled that he will lean toward state autonomy and look for opportunities to narrowly
construe the Dole test-but any such suggestion is quite speculative. See Alito Transcript, supra
note 102, at 390.
2006]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the other two have left the Court. Second, there is no support from
the political constituency which sent Roberts and Alito to their cur-
rent positions for cutting back the substantive scope of federal power.
On the contrary, both corporate interests and social conservatives
nurture major legislative proposals that, if anything, push the envel-
ope of congressional Commerce Clause authority further in significant
respects than it has previously been pushed.
These factors were evident in the Court's much-noted January 2006
decision in Gonzales v. Oregon.116 In that case, a 6-3 majority upheld
an Oregon law authorizing physician-assisted suicide. However, the
three justices perceived as the most politically conservative-Scalia,
Thomas, and Roberts-voted for preemption of the Oregon statute.
Scalia's dissent, filled with scorn for Oregon's liberal policy goals,
marshalled arguments that ran roughshod over applicable "federal-
ism" doctrines.11 7 Furthermore, Justice Thomas, not previously
known for retreating from positions simply because they had been re-
peatedly rejected by Court majorities, did just that in this case.",, He
announced that his past insistence on "reconsidering" and "modify-
ing" the Court's sixty-year old "Commerce Clause jurisprudence" was
"water over the dam."11 9 Finally, the six justices who ruled for Ore-
gon did not base their decision on the constitutional scope of the
Commerce Clause. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion made clear
that Congress could, if it wished, preempt Oregon's assisted suicide
regime. The Court ruled simply, and with compelling evidence from
the statutory text and legislative history, that it had chosen not to do
so. The Court unanimously avoided applying to regulation of
medicine-certainly a traditional state responsibility-the type of cat-
egorical protection from federal control that Chief Justice Rehnquist
seemed inclined to confer on local public school curricula when he
insisted in Lopez that there are subject-matter areas which "the states
may regulate but Congress may not. 1 20 For all these reasons, the Or-
116. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
117. Id. at 926-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 940 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 939-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited sources such as the American
Medical Association for the proposition that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally in-
compatible with the physician's role as healer" to defend the Attorney General's decision to
override Oregon's definition of "legitimate medical practice." Id. at 932 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)). Most remarkably, he acknowledged that the issue of what is legiti-
mate medical practice, on which the case turned, rested "on a naked value judgment"-but
missed not a beat in approving the Attorney General's decision to invalidate a state statute
reflecting a contrary judgment. Id. at 937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995).
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egon case came close to definitively ending the Rehnquist Court's flir-
tation with paring back Congress' post-New Deal Commerce Clause
power.
But it soon became apparent that the signals sent in Gonzales v.
Oregon-however close-were not quite definitive. On a Court
newly shifted one vote to the right with Justice O'Connor's replace-
ment by Justice Alito, ideology may trump doctrinal consistency. This
possibility is graphically illustrated by the Court's end-of-the-term de-
cision on the scope of federal authority under the Clean Water Act to
regulate wetlands.121 In Rapanos, five members of the Court (Justices
Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), in separate opin-
ions, voted for two standards that, while distinct, appear to mutually
preserve broad authority for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
police wetlands that may potentially contaminate or otherwise affect
navigable waters. 122  However, four justices-Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito-signed a plurality opinion calling for a major
rollback of CWA enforcement. Justice Scalia, the author of the opin-
ion, announced a novel, quasi-constitutional theory confining federal
authority in rigid, categorical terms. His approach would confine fed-
eral regulatory authority to cover only those wetlands that maintain a
permanent "surface [water] connection" with navigable waters. t 23 He
would deny the Corps-and Congress-the flexibility to take into ac-
count the impact that pollution in arroyos, swamps, or ditches, not
permanently flowing into navigable waters, could have in degrading
the national water supply. This abstract framework for truncating the
CWA clashes starkly with the practical, deferential approach he em-
braced a year earlier in Raich to uphold the Justice Department's de-
121. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
122. Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, technically for himself alone, but which
controlled the outcome of and established the rule of the case. His new formulation extends
CWA jurisdiction to wetlands having a "significant nexus" to navigable waterways. Id. at
2236-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While admonishing the District Court and the Army Corps
to respect this new "significant nexus" test, Justice Kennedy made clear that he intended this
formula to be broad enough to cover the particular regulatory activity challenged in the case,
and otherwise to permit the Corps generally to maintain its aggressive approach to controlling
water pollution under the CWA. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, writing sepa-
rately for the four "liberal" justices, contended that the Corps' regulation of the wetlands at
issue in the case constituted a reasonable interpretation of the Act, thereby deserving judicial
deference under Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2219-20. Technically, Justice Scalia's opinion amounted simply to
construction of the scope of the CWA. But the argument emphasized that his narrow interpreta-
tion was necessary to avoid an allegedly serious constitutional question and that a more gener-
ous view could broach Congress' Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 2220-35.
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cision to prohibit home-grown marijuana for medicinal purposes. 12 4
Indeed, Scalia's constriction of federal Commerce Clause authority in
Rapanos sounds like Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion in Lopez,
seemingly repudiated by Scalia and five of his colleagues in Raich,
that certain major subject-matter areas are hermetically sealed off
from federal control, no matter how substantial their effects on na-
tional problems.
Scalia's florid opinion made little effort to mute his ideological dis-
dain for the regulatory scheme and, especially, the agency responsible
for enforcing it, or to claim that his decision was driven by deference
to the agency, pertinent judicial precedent, Congress, or even the pref-
erences of the states. He derided the Corps of Engineers as "an en-
lightened despot" exercising "discretion that would befit a local
zoning board. ' 125 He asserted that an "immense expansion of federal
regulation of land use. . . has occurred under the Clean Water Act...
during the past five Presidential administrations. ' 126 Nor was he im-
pressed that the agency's interpretation of its CWA authority had
stood for 30 years. On the contrary, Justice Scalia saw this long-term
bipartisan endorsement, not as a reason for Chevron deference, but as
"entrenched Executive error.' ' 127 Similarly, the fact that "the lower
courts have continued to uphold the Corps' sweeping assertions of ju-
risdiction" was no reason to defer to judicial precedent.1 28 As for
Congress' failure to overturn the Corps' interpretation, Scalia
shrugged this off as "perhaps" due "simply to their unwillingness to
confront the environmental lobby. 11 29 Much like Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's 2000 opinion striking down the Violence Against Women Act
in Morrison, Scalia's Rapanos opinion purported to protect state and
local governments from congressional usurpation-in the teeth of vig-
orous endorsement of the federal regulator's position by a strong ma-
jority of state governments, and even the county in which the
developer plaintiff's wetland parcel was located.
Scalia's tirade would appear to mock the canons of "judicial mod-
esty" repeatedly embraced by nominee Roberts as his jurisprudential
124. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Raich
contended that the limits of congressional authority to regulate activity that affects interstate
commerce without actually being "in" interstate commerce depends, not on the scope of the
commerce power per se, but on the validity of Congress' judgment that such regulation is a
"necessary and proper"-i.e., practically defensible-means of controlling interstate commerce.
Id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224.
126. Id. at 2215.
127. Id. at 2232.
128. Id. at 2217.
129. Id. at 2231.
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lodestar. Nevertheless, now-Chief Justice Roberts joined Scalia's
Rapanos opinion. In his short concurrence, the Chief Justice implied
that his aim may merely have been to teach the Army Corps and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency a lesson in humility, not to
significantly constrain federal water pollution control. He stressed
that the agencies could "readily" have avoided this rebuke by follow-
ing up on the Court's invitation five years earlier 130 to develop,
through new regulations, "some notion of an outer bound to the reach
of their authority" that would give them "plenty of room to operate,"
while tactfully acknowledging and tempering the Corps' prior "essen-
tially boundless view of the scope of its power."' 131 But Roberts might
have made the same point by concurring in Justice Kennedy's opinion.
With his "significant nexus" formulation, Justice Kennedy offered a
broad but workable standard-a standard that is conceptually similar
to aspects of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence that were
specifically endorsed by Roberts in his confirmation hearing. 32 His
choice to join Scalia's rather than Kennedy's opinion in Rapanos nec-
essarily raises questions about the Chief Justice's commitment to up-
hold broad, post-New Deal Commerce Clause authority for federal
statutes and programs that offend conservative policy goals and
constituencies.
B. Still at Risk-Congressional and Citizen Enforcement of
Twentieth- Century Civil Rights and Safety-Net Safeguards
While the Roberts Court appears likely to reinstate traditional "ra-
tional basis" deference to congressional definitions of the reach of its
Commerce Clause powers-or to reconfirm the deference reinstated
by Raich-and reconfirm similar deference regarding Spending
Clause powers, similar levels of confidence are not warranted regard-
ing the other two components of the Rehnquist Court's federalism
agenda-cutting back Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment authority and curbing private suits to enforce federal statutory
rights.
130. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
131. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, J., concurring) (referring to the decision in Solid
Waste Agency, 531 U.S. 159).
132. Limiting CWA jurisdiction to wetlands having a "significant nexus" to navigable waters is
closely equivalent to limiting congressional jurisdiction to apply the Commerce Clause to
noneconomic activities having a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce. See Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005).
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1. A Second Mugging of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Senator Specter appeared to draw Roberts into an acknowledge-
ment that the Court might be entering questionable territory when it
quarreled over the veracity of Congress' fact-finding. Roberts also
seemed to suggest that the Federalism Five's late-1990s substitution of
congruent and proportional scrutiny for traditional, necessary and
proper, rational basis deference might be in play as a result of the
Court's Hibbs and Lane decisions. But such straws in the wind do not
definitively reveal which way the Roberts Court will veer-whether it
will seize on Hibbs and Lane to continue retreating from Kimel, Gar-
rett, and Morrison, or whether these more recent cases will prove
merely a temporary respite from continued evisceration of Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.
How the Roberts Court will treat congressional efforts to reinvigo-
rate the Fourteenth Amendment is particularly uncertain because a
key issue was not discussed during his confirmation hearing. The issue
involves the Rehnquist Court's expansion of the doctrine that state
governments should enjoy "sovereign immunity" against lawsuits for
damages, even when Congress has prescribed such lawsuits as an es-
sential remedy for violations of constitutional rights or of statutory
provisions designed to protect constitutional rights. While "sovereign
immunity" is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the Feder-
alism Five aggressively invoked it in conjunction with other federal-
ism-related doctrines to impede congressional efforts to "enforce" the
Fourteenth Amendment and to implement its Commerce Clause
authority. 133
In the Roberts hearing, Senator Specter did not expressly table the
sovereign immunity issue, choosing instead to focus exclusively on its
congruent and proportional recipe for micro-managing Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation. This decision appears under-
standable. For one thing, the Court's sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence is so muddled that it seems to make congruent and proportional
the test both for evaluating the validity of the law and for determining
whether Congress validly "abrogated" sovereign immunity.134 More
133. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Congress lacks
power to abrogate sovereign immunity against suits to enforce the Americans with Disabilities
Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress lacks power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity against suits to enforce the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Semi-
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress lacks power to abrogate immunity
against suits to enforce statutes implementing its Commerce Clause authority).
134. The Court established the congruent and proportional test as the criterion for determin-
ing the reach of Congress' authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by "appropriate"
legislation, under Section Five of the Amendment, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520,
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importantly, Specter's overall point was simply that the Court's feder-
alism jurisprudence, in its various guises, amounted to an unwarranted
abandonment of the principle that federal legislation must stand if ra-
tionally related to a constitutionally legitimate objective. Like the
other doctrines that Specter and his colleagues criticized in the Rob-
erts hearings, the Federalism Five's expansion of state "sovereign im-
munity" is a purely judge-made excuse for invalidating "rational"
legislative solutions.135 So, in Specter's analysis, reinstating "rational
basis" deference for evaluating the scope of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority should topple not only the congruent and propor-
tional domino, but the inflated sovereign immunity domino as well.
If the Roberts Court continues to scrutinize Fourteenth Amend-
ment enforcement legislation while backing off of Commerce Clause
measures, that asymmetry would moot any residual pretense that the
Court's agenda in this realm owes anything to genuine concerns about
"federalism." Instead, the Court would be pursuing a blatant reprise
of the post-Reconstruction Court's notorious mugging of the Four-
teenth Amendment by once again inventing an anomalous, willful
misreading of the express enforcement authority conferred by Section
Five on Congress to nullify the egalitarian sweep of the equal protec-
tion and due process protections present in Section One. 136
On a more concrete level, continuing down the Kimel-Morrison-
Garrett path would be transparently designed to undo specific major
social reform laws enacted by Congress during and after the civil
rights revolution of the 1960s. This would be not only a "classic exam-
ple of judicial activism," as Senator Specter observed, but activism of
an egregiously political kind-smacking of Bush v. Gore as much as
533 (1997). Two years later, the Court applied the same formulation, congruent and propor-
tional, albeit radically tightened into a much more stringent barrier for Congress to overcome, to
determine whether legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity was valid. See Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999). In the cases
especially targeted by Senator Specter in the hearing, the Court did not appear to perceive a
difference between determining the scope of "appropriate" under Section Five, on the one hand,
and determining whether Congress had authority under the Supremacy Clause to abrogate sov-
ereign immunity. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. 356.
135. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. The Rehnquist Court reinforced this view of the motivation of the Federalism Five by
revitalizing post-Reconstruction cases notorious for willfully misconstruing the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, such as the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1882), and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), all fully on par with
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racial segregation as "separate but equal"), as
aimed at gutting the Reconstruction amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 617-27 (2000); see also Nathan Newman & J.J. Gass, A New Birth of Freedom: The Forgot-
ten History of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, Brennan Center for Justice, N.Y.U. School
of Law (2003), http://brennancenter.org/resources/ji/ji5.pdf.
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Lochner.137 It would not merely pit the Court against Congress in an
abstract, institutional sense; it would align a twenty-first century con-
servative Court majority against specific enactments of the twentieth-
century reformist Congress. Were they to take this tack, these con-
servative Court majorities might be in a position to count on conserva-
tive congressional majorities, or at worst substantial minorities, to
block retribution or the reenactment of stricken or weakened legisla-
tion. Indeed, such actions would not only promote the ideological
agenda of political conservatives, but would, like Bush v. Gore, serve
the political interests of Capitol Hill allies by sparing conservative rep-
resentatives the political risk of actually casting votes to repeal or di-
lute widely popular laws like the ADEA (Kimel), the ADA (Garrett),
the VAWA (Morrison), or the FMLA (Hibbs).
The Court's January 2006 decisions, especially its unanimous United
States v. Georgia decision upholding certain ADA suits against states
by state prisoners, reinforce the impression left by Roberts' confirma-
tion testimony that the velocity or even perhaps the direction of the
Rehnquist Court's assault on Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
could be in play. As in Hibbs and Lane, the Court in United States v.
Georgia confronted circumstances in which linear application of the
strict devolutionist logic of City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett could
have barred Congress from granting a judicial remedy in morally and
politically compelling circumstances. 138 In each of these cases, Court
majorities that included members of the Federalism Five found ways
to blink. Such results invite the type of speculation that Roberts
voiced in his hearing, that the Court was perhaps having second
thoughts about continuously ratcheting up doctrinal devices like con-
gruent and proportional and "sovereign immunity" to throttle alto-
gether major twentieth-century Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation. However, the picture remains decidedly mixed. Hibbs
and Lane included vigorous dissents that could eventually be em-
braced by Roberts and especially Alito, as well as by any future Bush
137. Letter of Aug. 8, supra note 11; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (where a 5-4 majority
overrode the Florida Supreme Court's construction of its state's election laws and precluded a
recount that, at the time, was perceived as having the potential to transfer from George W. Bush
to Al Gore, Florida's electoral votes and, thereby, the 2000 Presidential election).
138. 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). Justice Scalia stated the facts of United States v. Georgia:
Among [the prisoner-plaintiff's] more serious allegations, he claimed that he was con-
fined for 23-to-24 hours per day in a 12-by-3-foot cell in which he could not turn his
wheelchair around. He alleged that the lack of accessible facilities rendered him una-
ble to use the toilet and shower without assistance, which was often denied. On . ..
several other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own feces and urine while




appointees. Furthermore, while unanimous, United States v. Georgia
was carefully hedged by Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, so that
future majorities, if so inclined, could readily limit the case to its
facts. 139
2. "Denigrating" Congress by Closing the Courthouse Door to
Citizen Enforcement?
Even more than in the Rehnquist Court's Fourteenth Amendment
Section Five decisions, selective, politically driven disdain for Con-
gress seems apparent in its drive to limit privately initiated court en-
forcement of federal statutory rights. The new Chief Justice has given
no indication of disowning or tempering this initiative. Over the past
quarter century, the Rehnquist Court piled up impediments for plain-
tiffs seeking to enforce federal rights through § 1983, blindsiding Con-
gress with new and unanticipated tests for upholding citizen suits, and
using concerns over the "delicate federal-state balance" to justify the
imposition of "clear statement" and kindred rules designed to frus-
trate rather than fulfill congressional intent. But the justices have not
been consistent in protecting states from federal court plaintiffs. On
the contrary, over precisely the same period, the Court has vigilantly
invalidated state laws and actions inconsistent with federal economic
statutory schemes by invoking the judge-made doctrine of "preemp-
tion" under the Supremacy Clause. 140 In the most recent Supreme
Court reaffirmation of hospitality toward private rights of action that
allege a preemption of state law, Justice Scalia registered "no doubt
that federal courts have jurisdiction" to entertain a suit alleging that a
state regulation "is pre-empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail ... 141 The
139. Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]hile the Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the
scope of Congress's 'prophylactic' enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, no one doubts that § 5 grants the power to 'enforce' . . . the Amendment by creating
private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions." Id. at 881 (citations
omitted).
140. More broadly, the Court has consistently given short shrift to the "delicate" federal-state
balance in striking down state actions under the federal treaty power, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (labeling requirements preempt state tort law); Crosby v. Nat'l For-
eign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (interference with foreign affairs power); Lauren K.
Saunders, Preemption as an Alternative to Section 1983, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 705 (2005) (collecting cases and providing analysis).
141. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) (quoting Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.6 (1983)). Public interest plaintiffs have begun bringing
preemption-based suits, as the courts have obstructed § 1983 suits, in part at the urging of my
late colleague Herbert Semmel's October 2002 article following the Verizon case. See Herbert
Semmel, Enforcing Federal Rights Through 1331/Supremacy Clause Jurisdiction, NAT'L SENIOR
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Court has yet to confront the dissonance between its readiness to au-
thorize preemption-based challenges to state laws-most of which are
brought by corporate plaintiffs-and its stinginess about § 1983-based
suits, which have traditionally been brought by plaintiffs alleging vio-
lations of civil rights or safety-net statutes.1 42
To be sure, there are sensible considerations involved in the Court's
attempts to limit the reach of § 1983 jurisdiction-considerations em-
braced by all factions on the Court when applied in a balanced and
good-faith manner. But concerns about overwhelming the courts, par-
alyzing state and local agencies, provoking frivolous litigation, and le-
galizing what should be policy and administrative issues, are not
federalism issues at all. These issues turn on principles of sound ad-
ministration-not "sovereignty." Questions about allocating institu-
tional roles and responsibilities would be no less salient, and the real
issues at stake in particular cases would not differ materially, if the
United States were a unitary governmental system like France, and
what are now state and local schools, hospitals, police departments,
health and welfare departments, and other agencies were simply ad-
ministrative units of the central government. Claptrap about "immu-
nity," "dignity," and the "delicate federal balance," injected into the
discussion by the Federalism Five and their antecedents, contributes
nothing but confusion to the enterprise of generating workable and
useful rules for judicial review of agency decisions.
In effect, the Rehnquist Court's multiple, and selective, techniques
for narrowing and obstructing enforcement of social and economic re-
form legislation have avoided the sort of frontal assault on congres-
sional authority that the Lochner Court mounted, and which many
conservative proponents of judicial restraint, including Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, condemn. By thus undermining enforce-
ment, whether by Congress under Section Five of the Fourteenth
CITIZENs L. CENTER, http://www.nsclc.org/federalrights/1331article102102.htm. Cases following
Semmel's counsel are now percolating through the lower federal courts. See,. e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2005) (suits to assert
supremacy of federal law may proceed even where no § 1983-enforceable "rights" are at stake).
But cf. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006) (Medicaid requirements unenforce-
able under § 1983 may nevertheless be enforced via injunctive relief in preemption action);
Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d 585 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (preemption
jurisdiction rejected where claim is "functionally equivalent" to § 1983 claim).
142. However, just this past term the Court may have slipped "clear statement" reasoning into
preemption analysis. In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., it cautioned courts to construe am-
biguous federal laws not to require preemption "because the States are independent sovereigns
in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-
law causes of action." 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (alterations omitted) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
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Amendment, or by private citizens and the courts under § 1983, the
Court's conservative majority has mounted a form of legal guerilla
warfare. That strategy has produced significant results, and has great
potential to further magnify those results, if the logic of leading Rehn-
quist Court precedents is carried further. Michael Greve of the
American Enterprise Institute commented on this shrinking availabil-
ity of enforcement:
The Supreme Court's antientitlement doctrines are connected, such
that plaintiffs who manage to evade one obstacle are bound to stum-
ble over another. Plaintiffs who escape from restrictive statutory in-
terpretation into section 1983 will find that route, too, strewn with
obstacles. They may find that their purported right was unrecog-
nized in 1871 [a reference to Justice Scalia's doctrine, noted above].
Or they may find that their claims for monetary damages-which
are often the only effective means of forcing state and local govern-
ments into compliance-are blocked by a slew of Supreme Court
decisions granting the states sovereign immunity .... Let plaintiffs
argue that the state has waived its immunity by accepting federal
funds, and they will lose. Let plaintiffs seek to obtain relief by nam-
ing a state's officers, rather than the state itself, as a defendant, and
they will find that this so-called Ex Parte Young rule, once readily
available, has become a rare exception. 143
Greve's disarming candor confirms an observation by Professors
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey that deserves more notice than it
has received. They note that the Rehnquist Court has in effect
deployed these "super-strong clear statement rules" as if they were
"quasi-constitutional" commands, and used them "to confine Con-
gress's power in areas in which Congress has the constitutional power
to do virtually anything. 1 44 Eskridge and Frickey noted that the
Court's clear statement rules for promoting "federalism and other
structural values ... are almost as countermajoritarian as now discred-
ited Lochner-style judicial review. In this respect, the Court's new ca-
nons amount to a 'backdoor' version of the constitutional activism
that most Justices . . . have publicly denounced. '145
While Greve and kindred enthusiasts bitterly lament the Court's re-
cent retreat from its initial call for restructuring based on "first princi-
ples" and "enumerated powers," their agenda of neutralizing
twentieth-century civil rights, safety-net, and regulatory legislation re-
mains operable as long as the Rehnquist-era back-door barriers to en-
143. Michael S. Greve, Federalism, Yes. Activism, No., FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, July 1, 2001,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15851/pub-detail.asp (emphasis added).
144. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992).
145. Id. at 598.
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forcement are in place. The new Chief Justice participated as an
advocate in putting in place key building blocks of this obstacle
course, and was less than forthcoming in answering questions on the
issue during his hearing. Justice Alito may prove at least equally in-
clined to build these barriers to court access higher and wider. In one
cryptic and ominous 2003 concurring opinion, he gratuitously forecast
that in the future, the Supreme Court could cut off all litigation by
Medicaid patients challenging state compliance with federal statutory
and regulatory requirements, even though at the time only two or
three justices took that position.146 Alito's promotion could create a
new majority on this issue, and make his 2003 forecast a self-fulfilling
prophecy. But after Raich and Roberts' confirmation hearing, rein-
forced by the Court's rebuffs to New Federalism notions in cases like
Hibbs, Lane, and Sabri, these doctrinal barriers to court access must
be seen for what they are: legal strategies driven by "anti-entitlement"
policy preferences, not principles grounded in "federalism." In partic-
ular, observers in the press, and especially Congress, should appre-
hend that this stealth assault on federal rights enforcement-and
congressional intent and authority-is a brand of activism lacking
even a patina of constitutional legitimacy.
The manipulative and politically driven character of the conserva-
tive justices' application of clear statement and related devices was
strikingly illuminated by Justice Scalia's recent dissent in Gonzales v.
Oregon. If there was ever an appropriate situation in which to require
from Congress a clear statement before displacing state legislative ac-
tion, Attorney General Ashcroft's interpretation that the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) overrode Oregon's assisted suicide regime was
that case. Not only did the CSA lack any textual indication'that Con-
gress intended it as a device for outlawing physician-assisted suicide,
and not only was such a design far from the statutory purpose of
preventing illicit drug abuse, but Congress had actually rejected Ash-
croft's assisted suicide amendment, offered when he was a Senator
from Missouri, in the course of reauthorizing the CSA.147 Upholding
the Justice Department's prohibition would not only have bypassed
Congress, but would have preempted an active political debate in
state legislatures. As Chief Justice Rehnquist had recently observed
146. In Sabree v. Richman, a Third Circuit panel undertook a meticulous analysis of Supreme
Court precedent in reversing a district court decision that would have barred all Medicaid en-
forcement private actions. 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004). Judge Alito concurred, but volunteered
his view that "the analysis and decision of the District Court may reflect the direction that future
Supreme Court cases in this area will take." Id. at 194 (Alito, J., concurring).
147. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 913 (2006).
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in ruling against federal judicial interference with that process,
"[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as
it should in a democratic society.' 48
Justice Scalia's passionate dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon acknowl-
edged the apparent conflict of his position with the Court's "clear-
statement cases." He offered a series of highly technical assertions to
distinguish each of what he described as separate "lines" of such cases,
without addressing the underlying common policy of deferring major
policy and political judgments to Congress and state legislatures. 149 In
a disarming burst of candor, Scalia acknowledged that the issue driv-
ing him to override applicable canons of democratic deference-the
"legitimacy of physician-assisted suicide . .. ultimately rests . . . on a
naked value judgment. '150 What he did not seem pressed to explain
was why an executive official with no direction from Congress should
be permitted to impose that value judgment on states with a contrary
view.
Thus, Gonzales v. Oregon not only confirms that the Commerce
Clause lynchpin of the Rehnquist federalism revolution is now, in Jus-
tice Thomas' terms, "water over the dam," but vividly demonstrates
the extent to which sponsors of that "revolution" consider it little
more than a rationale for political forum-shopping, invoked when it
serves the "value judgments" on their agenda and finessed when it
does not.
This brazen willingness to trump Congress' actual objectives with
judge-made "clear statement" rules was confirmed with a vengeance
in one of the final decisions of the 2005 term, Arlington Board of Edu-
cation.1 51 In this case, the increasingly familiar quartet of Roberts,
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, held that under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a parent pre-
vailing in an action against a school board was not entitled to reim-
bursement for consultant's services as part of the attorney's fees
award mandated by the Act.152 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito
148. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
149. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. at 926-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 937 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Certain of Justice Scalia's assertions seem not only
sophistic, but just plain inaccurate. For example, his contention that "[t]he clear-statement rule
based on the presumption against pre-emption does not apply because the Directive does not
pre-empt any state law," is a claim that, presumably, would ring hollow for a doctor prosecuted
by the USDOJ for conduct sanctioned by the Oregon statute. Id. at 935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006).
152. Id. at 2463-64.
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reached this judgment in the teeth of a statement in the Conference
Report meshing the House and Senate bills into the final legislation:
"The conferees intend that the term 'attorneys' fees as part of the
costs' include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses .... -153
Implicitly, Justice Alito appeared to acknowledge that this language
reflected the actual intent of the senators and representatives who
wrote the law, and that the Court's contrary result countermanded
that intent. But this was no matter, he explained, because the IDEA
is a "Spending Clause" statute providing funds to states in exchange
for state compliance with specified conditions, and "[i]n a Spending
Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the Members of both
Houses intend but what the States are clearly told [in the statutory
text] regarding the conditions that go along with the acceptance of
those funds. 1 54
In other words, states and the courts may ignore Congress' clear
intent as to conditions incident to state acceptance of federal funds if
such conditions, however minor, are not spelled out in specific detail
in the statutory text. In this particular case, Justice Alito's disregard of
congressional intent appears especially stark. He belittled the instruc-
tion to award expert consultant's fees as merely a snippet of "legisla-
tive history." But this statement was not merely an individual
member's floor statement, nor even the report of a House or Senate
committee accompanying a preliminary version of the bill. It was in
the final report of the House-Senate conference, signed by all confer-
ees representing both houses, and comprising both their final text and
their explanatory statement. 55 To anyone knowledgeable about the
process by which Congress enacts legislation, such conference report
explanatory statements can be more reliable, considered, and precise
guides to Congress' intention than imprecise statutory text-and the
text at issue here was certainly not precise in any sense of the term.
Justice Alito's contention stops short of embracing a radical devolu-
tionist theory, repeatedly scorned by the Rehnquist Court and dis-
missed by nominee Roberts, that Spending Clause statutes are not the
supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause and merely au-
thorize one independent sovereign-the federal government-to
enter into a contract with another and separate sovereign-individual
state governments. But Alito's argument, which was quite gratuitous
153. Id. at 2463 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.)).
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 2466-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 56:1
FEDERALISM R.LP.?
and unnecessary to justify the majority's conclusion in the case,156 will
surely be seized upon as a signal to downgrade the stature of "Spend-
ing Clause" safety-net programs like Medicaid and Social Security,
and to read them less expansively than other federal laws.
In sum, omens from its first term indicate that the Roberts Court
will ratchet up deployment of the arsenal of Rehnquist-era "anti-enti-
tlement" procedural devices, such as its "clear statement" rules, to
confound the New Deal and Great Society Congresses that enacted
them, and the citizens who rely upon them.
VI. WRONG FROM THE START-FATAL FLAWS OF THE
NEW FEDERALISM
What should one make of the Rehnquist Court's roller coaster ride
from Lopez to Raich? Was the federalism revolution an illusion?
Could the conservative court-watchers who hailed the dawn of a new
day, and the liberals who recoiled in horror, both have been so far off
base? In fact, they were not. Had the Court followed through on the
Chief Justice's call in Lopez to hermetically seal off activities which
are inherently "local" from those which are "national," and had a ma-
jority embraced Justice Thomas' whopper that "We the People"
means "We the States," a genuine constitutional revolution, or coun-
terrevolution, would have indeed been at hand. 157
A. Repackaged, Unworkable, Incoherent
With their bold rhetoric and disciplined unity, the Federalism Five
put forth a credible threat to revive "states' rights" as a major, judi-
cially enforceable component of the twenty-first-century Constitution.
So how can the precipitous fracturing that caused that threat to recede
so abruptly be explained?
To begin with, the task may simply have been impossible. The
Rehnquist Court's Lopez-Raich 180-degree change was not the first
failed attempt to draw judicially manageable boundaries between fed-
eral and state spheres in the post-New Deal, post-World War II uni-
verse. In 1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the Burger
156. In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg called Justice Alito's "clear statement" theory
"unwarranted" and unnecessary to the Court's result. Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
157. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845-926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Former Reagan Solicitor General Charles Fried termed close to "revolutionary" the fact that
three justices-Rehnquist, Scalia, and O'Connor-joined in Thomas' remarkable assertion that
"the notion of popular sovereignty that undergirds the Constitution does not erase state bounda-
ries, but rather tracks them." Id. at 849 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Charles Fried, Fore-
word: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (1995).
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Court, with then-Associate Justice Rehnquist writing the opinion,
overruled a Warren Court decision only eight-years old, and declared
state and local government agencies that performed "traditional gov-
ernmental functions" immune from federal minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour requirements. 158 Nine years later, almost precisely as fast
as the Lopez-Raich turnabout, the Court junked this states' rights ini-
tiative and overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.159 Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Blackmun, who had concurred in the National League of Cities
decision, explained that the "attempt to draw the boundaries of state
regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function"'
had spawned so much confusion as to be "unworkable.' 160 From this
perspective, the bold venture on which Rehnquist persuaded his four
colleagues to embark in 1995 simply repackaged an idea that, like its
predecessor, did not work because some allies soon concluded that it
could not work. Despite contemporaneous favorable reviews by
prominent academic conservatives of the value of Rehnquist's Lopez
enterprise of establishing judicially enforceable state/federal bounda-
ries, 161 the undertaking was simply a fool's errand from the get-go.
These repeated failures to formulate durable doctrinal solutions re-
flect deeper incoherence and inconsistency in the theoretical under-
pinnings of the Court's federalism efforts. Indeed, this foundational
weakness has led to multiple reversals and anomalies in "federalism"
line-drawing exercises, of which the Usery-Garcia and Lopez-Raich
fiascos are only the most widely noted. One example is the Rehnquist
Court's 2000 retreat in Reno v. Condon162 from Justice Scalia's thun-
derous 1997 ukase against federal "commandeering" of state agencies
and officials in Printz v. United States.163 Another is the long-standing
158. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
159. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
160. Id. at 531. In dissent, a furious soon-to-be Chief Justice Rehnquist vowed that antici-
pated new Republican appointments would in time reverse the Court's reversal; his forecast,
vindicated a decade later only to be undone once again in another decade, makes the Raich
reversal all the more ironic-indeed, poignant, in view of the Chief Justice's imminent death and
his passionate, career-long commitment to establishing a vision of federalism "first principles" he
was never able to effectively articulate or sell to a majority of his colleagues. See id. at 579-80
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers":
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995); Yoo, supra note 56.
162. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
163. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The Court in Reno v. Condon upheld the Drivers' Privacy Protec-
tion Act, which imposes restrictions on the sale by state and local governments of drivers' license
and registration records. 528 U.S. at 151. The Court did not overrule Printz, but instead distin-
guished it on the ground that the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act "regulates the States as the
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disconnect between the Court's hospitality to Supremacy Clause "pre-
emption"-based suits against state and local governments, usually
brought by or on behalf of businesses, and its general hostility to Four-
teenth Amendment-based private civil actions and § 1983 suits, which
are usually brought by or on behalf of traditional civil rights plaintiffs
or entitlement beneficiaries. Still another was the disconnect between
Rehnquist's proclamation in Lopez of categorical limits on Congress'
Commerce Clause authority, and his and the Court's persistent refusal
to apply similar reasoning to constrain Spending Clause authority-an
area where, indeed, the font of effectively unconstrained congres-
sional power is a decision by Chief Justice Rehnquist himself.'
64
B. No Political Juice
Over the past quarter century, certain pockets of the conservative
legal intelligentsia developed a variety of theories that provided co-
herent, comprehensive justifications for Rehnquist's far-reaching Lo-
pez rhetoric-justifications that acknowledged, and celebrated, its
truly radical implications. 165 Moreover, echoes of some of this aca-
demic theorizing resonated among the youthful cadres in the upper
reaches of the Reagan Justice Department, mocked as the "federalism
police" by Reagan's Solicitor General, Charles Fried.166 "Federalism"
was a prominent plank in the extraordinary platform for constitutional
change drafted by those cadres and issued as an official Department
publication in 1988.167 But, with the singular exception of Justice
Thomas, no member of the Federalism Five ever bought into these
far-reaching theories, much less was willing to embrace their practical,
owners of data bases," rather than affecting them "in their sovereign capacity to regulate their
own citizens." Id. In supposed contrast, which Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted rather than
explained, the Brady Handgun Control Act struck down in Printz required state and local law
enforcement officials to temporarily accept forms from prospective gun purchasers, provided to
them by firearms dealers, and conduct background checks, pending the completion of a federal
background check system. Id. at 149-50.
164. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
165. Perhaps the most prominent of these largely libertarian scholars and advocates, Univer-
sity of Chicago Professor Richard Epstein, cheerfully acknowledged that his interpretation of the
Commerce Clause would require "dismantling of large portions of the modern federal govern-
ment." Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1455 (1987).
166. In' his memoir, Fried notes that he was "pulled over more than once and issued federal-
ism speeding tickets." CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLU-
TION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 187 (1991).
167. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE AT7ORNEY GEN-
ERAL, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-
TATION (1988); see also Dawn Johnsen, Tipping the Scale, WASH. MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2002, at
15; Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presi-
dential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003).
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real-world consequences. As to the two Raich defectors from Rehn-
quist's original Federalism Five majority, Justice Kennedy displayed
his ambivalence from the start in his Lopez concurrence, 168 and Scalia
showed well before his elevation to the Court that his heart was never
in the federalism enterprise to begin with. He urged an early Federal-
ist Society audience to abandon conservatives' traditional fondness for
states' rights and to instead hatch ideas for exploiting federal power to
advance conservative goals (such as legislatively preempting state reg-
ulation), while at his own Supreme Court confirmation hearing, then-
Judge Scalia testified that the Tenth Amendment was a "constitutional
redundancy," and, d la Garcia, that drawing lines between the federal
and state spheres was an inherently unprincipled job, best suited for
Congress, not the courts. 169
If there was, from the beginning, little appetite on the Supreme
Court for an intellectually robust federalism jurisprudence, in society
at large there was virtually no interest in rolling back federal power to
even the limited extent involved in the Rehnquist Court's early deci-
sions. Indeed, a particularly curious aspect of the Federalism Five's
campaign was that it appeared to spring from nowhere, driven by no
discernible political constituency. To be sure, Republicans since the
Nixon years had consistently championed loosening the strings on
states accepting federal funds for Medicaid and other social welfare
programs. 170 But no bloc with electoral clout nor any elected politi-
cians sought declarations that Congress lacked the power, if it so
chose, to attach those strings, or to legislate to address any problem of
national significance, whether commercial in nature or otherwise.
Most of the laws struck down by the Federalism Five were co-spon-
sored by key Republican members of Congress and enacted by over-
whelming bipartisan congressional majorities. 171 Indeed, powerful
168. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (binding pre-
cedent "forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an
18th century economy"). In saying this, Kennedy was tacitly sparring with Justice Thomas'
"originalist" concurring plea to scuttle precedents permitting congressional regulation of matters
"affecting" interstate commerce.
169. See Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 20-22
(1982); Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1986)
(testimony of Antonin Scalia); James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia's "Split
Personality," 16 J.L. & POL. 231, 235, 271-76 (2000).
170. Robert Kuttner, Revenue Sharing Anyone? BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2001, at A15
("Revenue sharing was a Richard Nixon innovation, part of his so-called New Federalism.").
171. The Violence Against Women Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act were all enacted with strong bipartisan support, a point
stressed by Republican senators during the Roberts hearing. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38,
at 164, 217-18, 300.
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Republican constituencies strongly favor expanding federal domestic
power at the expense of the states. For decades, business groups have
promoted a variety of federal judicial and legislative approaches for
"preempting" or barring state regulation of various sorts, especially,
but by no means exclusively, tort law. 172 More recently, without the
least show of regret about displacing traditional state authority, social
conservatives have pushed the envelope of federal power to bar same-
sex marriage, partial-birth abortions, state-sanctioned medicinal mari-
juana use, and life-termination procedures, and even provoked an hys-
terical congressional attempt to wrest control of a particular intra-
family end-of-life dispute from the Florida state judicial system. In
this regard, it seems significant that in the Roberts hearing, Alabama's
Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, who is no moderate, readily acqui-
esced to Roberts' view that all Congress needed to do to comply with
Lopez was to amend the Gun Free School Zones Act with a jurisdic-
tional "hook."'1 73 In the same vein, Oklahoma's Senator Tom Coburn,
a particularly vocal social conservative, acknowledged on Meet the
Press that Roberts' successor nominee, Judge Samuel Alito, tres-
passed on turf that rightfully belonged to Congress when, in 1996, he
interpreted Lopez to preclude Congress from banning possession of
machine guns.' 74
C. Newt Envy?
If there was neither external pressure, nor a deep or widely shared
internal commitment behind the 1995 launch of the Rehnquist Court's
brief federalism adventure, how can it be explained? One sugges-
tion-impossible to document but plausible-would note the contem-
poraneous context, in particular the Republican "revolution" then in
its initial heady stages on Capitol Hill, dominating the headlines and,
no doubt, animating the social and political circles in which at least
some of the conservative justices traveled. For the first time since the
1930s, political conservatives had not only captured control of Con-
gress, but were using that control to promote a policy agenda of their
own-not just seeking to slow the advance of agendas developed by
liberals and moderates. 175 Up until that time, despite frantic condem-
172. For a critical compilation and analysis of laws and bills preempting state regulatory
schemes, see CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS, report pre-
pared for Representative Henry A. Waxman, United States House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Government Reform-Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division (June 2006).
173. Roberts Transcript, supra note 38, at 354.
174. See Lazarus & Saunders, supra note 25.
175. See DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, "TELL NEWT TO SHUT UP!" (1996) (re-
counting the "stunning" early success of the "Gingrich Revolution," (after firebrand House
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nation of the Rehnquist Court on the left, its persistently shaky con-
servative majorities had focused exclusively on moderating Warren
and Burger Court doctrinal initiatives.176 To Justices intrigued by the
legislative pyrotechnics flaring one block away in the Capitol building,
the question might well have arisen as to how they too could design
and execute an affirmative conservative agenda of their own. Given
the disparity of their respective viewpoints, this would have been no
easy undertaking. "Federalism" could have appeared a convenient
unifier as well as a high-sounding, respectable label for packaging an
array of new and old doctrinal weapons, equipping Court conserva-
tives to complement congressional Republicans' forays against the
vast statutory edifice built by decades of Democratic Congresses.
But if the federalism banner was hoisted primarily to pull together
this shaky coalition and express the political mood of that moment, it
is hardly surprising that the banner could not stay aloft, nor the coali-
tion hold together, for long. This denouement seems especially pre-
dictable, at least in hindsight, given the resilient indifference from
society at large and from the politically significant constituents of the
Republican coalition in particular, even after liberal and centrist ob-
servers began sounding increasingly loud and frequent alarm bells fol-
lowing the Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett decisions in 2000 and 2001.
As AEI Federalism Project Director Michael Greve observed soon
after the Raich decision in June 2005, the Court's federalism had
found "no takers. '177
VII. CONCLUSION: SAFEGUARD THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
OF FEDERALISM
When Senator Specter attacked the Rehnquist Court for scorning
federal laws which Congress had a "rational basis" to enact, he might
well have noted that the Court flouted not just the distinguished mid-
century conservative Justice John Marshall Harlan, who endorsed that
test, but his iconic namesake, Chief Justice John Marshall. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall formulated the foundational prescription for judicial
deference to Congress in 1819, construing for the first time the stan-
dard for reviewing the constitutionality of laws implementing the pow-
ers assigned to Congress by Article I. Marshall famously wrote "[l]et
Speaker Newt Gingrich of Georgia) in implementing the House Republicans' Contract with
America in 1995, after Republicans seized control of both houses of Congress in the 1994
elections).
176. See Simon Lazarus, He'll Look Better When He's Gone, WASH. POST, June 8, 2003, at B3.
177. Linda Greenhouse, The Rehnquist Court and Its Imperiled States' Rights Legacy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 4, at 3.
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the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional." 17 Lest anyone mistake his drift,
Marshall underscored that his construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause should under no circumstances be taken to weaken
Congress' authority, but rather to strengthen and protect its
discretion:
The result of the most careful and attentive consideration be-
stowed upon this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be
construed to restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of
the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of mea-
sures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the
government.179
Marshall's formula, rarely questioned until the 1990s, is not merely
a prudent acknowledgement of comparative institutional competence.
It is a safeguard for democracy. It ensures that the people's elected
representatives, not life-tenured appointed judges, figure out what the
"ends" of legislation should be, as well as "appropriate" means for
achieving those ends. This, of course, is precisely what President
Bush's talking points about "judicial restraint," and judges who won't
"legislate from the bench," signify in ordinary parlance. And it is pre-
cisely what Senator Specter had in mind when he excoriated the
Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence for departing from "rational basis" deference to
Congress.
As noted above, academic Constitution-in-Exile proponents have
sought to reinterpret Marshall's McCulloch formula by construing
"necessary and proper" as an invitation to the courts to limit congres-
sional power and intrusively review Congress' ends and means judg-
ments. This attempt to turn the traditional understanding of
McCulloch on its head is precisely the logic that underlies the post-
Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as spotlighted in Specter's at-
tacks on that jurisprudence. Similarly, Justice O'Connor, in her pas-
sionate dissent in Garcia, argued "[i]t is not enough that the 'end be
legitimate'; the means to that end chosen by Congress must not con-
travene the spirit of the Constitution."180 In other words, it is up to
the courts to determine what component of the "spirit of the Constitu-
178. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
179. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).




tion" Congress might have contravened. This would seem to be quite
a breathtaking proposition, especially for a conservative. Plainly,
leaving life-tenured judges free to trump democratic results on so pa-
tently flimsy a basis mocks all formulations of judicial restraint, con-
temporary or otherwise. In particular, it would seem difficult to
hypothesize an approach more flagrantly in conflict with Chief Justice
Marshall's injunction not to construe "necessary and proper" to "im-
pair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment" in imple-
menting the responsibilities of government.
Moreover, Marshall and the framers plainly viewed his deferential
approach as itself essential to the constitutional design of their federal
system. He and his compatriots would have been puzzled, and not
pleased, by the Federalism Five's claim to find in "federalism" a
source of sharp judge-made limitations on Congress' broad "necessary
and proper" discretionary authority. Implicit in letting Congress
choose the ends and calibrate the means of federal legislation is assur-
ing its constituents-the people.- freedom to choose between federal
and state instrumentalities to do whatever work needs to be done.
This was how federalism was' originally supposed to work. Madison
cogently explained this in The Federalist No. 46,'in a passage mysteri-
ously overlooked by Chief Justice Rehnquist and his comrades in their
crusade to turn "federalism" into a basis for judicial activism:
Notwithstanding the different modes in which [federal and state
governments] are appointed, we must consider both of them as sub-
stantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United
States.... [T]he ultimate authority ... resides in the people alone
... whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its
sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other .... [I]n every case
should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of
their common constituents .... [T]he people ought not surely to be
precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may dis-
cover it to be most due .... 181
Otherwise stated, federalism in the American system, as contempora-
neously explicated by Chief Justice Marshall, is primarily an instru-
ment for expanding democratic options for the electorate, not a
weapon for courts to deploy in order to "preclude" the people or their
representatives from choosing the options they "discover" to be
appropriate.
181. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297-98 (James Madison) (Penguin Classics ed., 1987) (em-
phasis added). Significantly, as evidence of his ambivalence from the start, portions of this pas-




Thus, the logic of Marshall's seminal necessary and proper analysis,
followed by modern courts and captured in Senator Specter's critique
of the Rehnquist Court's federalism campaign, fits hand-in-glove with
the view that the "safeguards of federalism" designed into the Consti-
tution are overwhelmingly "political"-not judicial-as articulated a
half-century ago by Columbia Professor Herbert Wechsler. 182 When,
in 1985, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority rejected Rehnquist's recipe for aggressive judicial defense of
judicially defined spheres for state immunity and exclusive state au-
thority, it expressly embraced Wechsler's "political safeguards" vision:
"[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our
system provides through state participation in federal governmental
action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the
States will not be promulgated.1 83 ,
The Wechsler-Garcia vision of a federalism policed by congres-
sional politics rather than judge-imposed formulas has been criticized
for mistaking the sources of state political influence over national pol-
icy, and for leaving the door open to federal overreaching that might
be important in principle though inconsequential in practice. 18 4 But
the plain truth, obvious to anyone familiar with the ways of Congress
or with the truly "cooperative"-often Byzantine-structure of most
major domestic federal programs fashioned in Congress, is that,
whatever its precise sources and nature, state participation in federal
policy-making is alive and well. 185 The states do not as a general mat-
ter need the Court to protect them from congressional overreaching.
182. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Wechs-
ler's thesis was refined and updated more recently by then-Harvard Law School professor, now
Dean of the Stanford Law School. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Politi-
cal Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
183. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
extensively cited Professor Wechsler's article, with approval. See id. at 550-56. The Commerce
Clause was the particular source of congressional authority at issue in Garcia, as in Lopez (and
Raich), but the logic put forward by Justice Blackmun would of course apply equally to legisla-
tion implementing the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments-if anything, with greater force,
given the express direction to Congress in Section Five and Section Two of those amendments to
"enforce" their respective substantive provisions and the recognition on the part of the framers
of those amendments of the need for aggressive congressional follow-up on their ratification.
184. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 182; Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of
Federalism's Political Safeguards, 119 HARV. L. REV. 609 (2005).
185. Justice Blackmun detailed numerous examples of the pervasive evidence of state and
local governments' ability to secure influential roles in federal programs and substantial federal
funding to support their own programs. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554-56.
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More frequently than not, when the Court has offered help, it has
soon found itself in over its head.
The Garcia Court got it right, as the Raich Court discovered and
Judiciary Committee Chair Senator Specter insisted, by way of ac-
knowledging limitations on the judiciary's competence, respecting de-
mocracy, and, indeed, capturing the vision of Chief Justice Marshall
and the framers for federalism itself. As a nominee and witness
before the Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice Roberts generally ex-
pressed his concurrence, often with emphasis and even eloquence.
Much is riding on how steadfastly the Roberts Court restores that
vision.
